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Thou shalt not separate thyself from the collective
(or:
There is strength in numbers)
By Alexander Eterman
Posted September 9, 2004
Judaism
is by definition a collective game. To be sure, this does not apply to Judaism
alone -- take soccer, for example -- so that much of what I am about to say
holds equally true for other phenomena. In this instance, the collective is the
alpha and omega of the entire system. Nor can it be otherwise: what
distinguishes a tribal religion from a universal one is that the former is
predicated on an actively existing tribe, or in other words, on an
all-embracing and closely knit collective.
Due
to the relative simplicity of the basic premise, I will not dwell too much on
Orthodox collectivism as such. Anthropologists have done it long ago and in
great detail. Naturally, their inquiry leaves out the distinctly Jewish
elements. I will point out from the outset that the prime tenet of real
Judaism is the injunction against "separating from the collective" (lifrosh
min ha'tzibur). There is a good reason why the Talmud stresses that when
the Jews live in unity, even if they are scoundrels and idolaters to the last
man, nether their enemies nor the Almighty himself can vanquish them; yet when
they squabble and drift apart, no amount of virtue will save them. This
extremely insightful statement reveals something like the physical core of
Orthodoxy: it rests on more than simple uniformity, but rather on unanimity
(lit. being of one anima!). Moreover, the self-definition of Orthodox Judaism
testifies to the same fact: it declares collective social (including religious,
though to a minor extent) functioning. To be an Orthodox individual means to be
a part of something greater and more exalted than yourself. This refers, of
course, to the earthly human collective rather than the Weltgeist. In Orthodox reality, the religious, God-oriented
aspect of life is marginal and almost totally eclipsed by the social aspect
with which it becomes intertwined. The Jews (similar to most kinds of Christian
fundamentalists) are not even supposed to pray alone -- they must go to the
synagogue and assemble the necessary quorum of ten coreligionists. One can
hardly assume that God will not hear their prayers otherwise -- it is, rather,
that their cherished collective will feel abandoned, even if it is for the sake
of God. Interestingly, in many
languages the term "denomination" is practically interchangeable with
the word "church", which refers above all to a house of worship, be
it a synagogue, a mosque or a Buddhist temple -- i.e. a place designated for
collective prayer. Therefore being part of a distinct confession means -- among
other things, or perhaps above all -- belonging to a prayer group. The fact
that it is difficult to properly focus on prayer in a synagogue or an
Evangelical communal hall (true prayer requires concentration, a meditative
state, which essentially means solitude, no matter whether physical or mental
-- both are forbidden in the Orthodox scheme of things) -- makes no real
difference: the object in those places of worship is not prayer to God but
collective self-expression as sanctioned by the collective leadership. Genuine
and intense praying is not done by the congregation in temples but by hermit
monks of various denominations, who seek solitude for that very reason. On the
other hand, Orthodox believers of every ilk huddle together in collectives,
replacing meditation with an effectively collective act.
In
the case of the Jews, the clustering herd instinct is extremely powerful,
having long ago become deeply entrenched. A Jew must not only pray but also
study in a collective -- both in a small collective (the chevruta [1])
and a larger one (the yeshiva -- preferably a noisy hall packed tight with
colleagues), and definitely out loud. [2]
He must rejoice, mourn, or simply spend time in that collective. An Orthodox
person who shuns the collective is certainly a heretic, if not an outright
subversive. Thus a devout Jew must find himself a rabbi who will then serve as
his leader, mentor, and confessor (see the commandment aseh lechah rav --
choose yourself a rabbi), guiding him along the true path, i.e. showing him the
one, divinely decreed way of cooking a chicken, tying shoelaces, blowing the
nose, where to pasture a goat, and whether the earth is flat or round. What is
more, his very raison d'etre consists of achieving the goals of the
collective, which are constantly defined and redefined by the ubiquitous
leaders (the gedolim), erecting a tower of Babel that is collective in
its essence. In any Orthodox framework, the voluntary existence of a Jew
outside the collective and the collective consensus is theoretically
impossible. That is precisely why throughout the eighteen centuries of the
rigid rule of rabbinical Orthodoxy, there have not been any solitary Orthodox
Jews. An Orthodox person can be physically removed from the collective by being
imprisoned, yet in his mentality he remains part of his compact tribe,
suffering from his enforced isolation more than from all other prison
hardships, making no attempt whatsoever to arrange a different, individual
religious life. Orthodox aloneness is inconceivable; it has no feasible
prototype, no precedent. It is unrealizable, a perfect oxymoron. Thus a
voluntary withdrawal from the collective cannot be innocuous in principle -- it
spells a departure from Orthodox Judaism, or even from Judaism itself.
Otherwise why withdraw? After all,
Jewish Orthodox collectives are sacred communities led by sanctified leaders!
It is only within its framework that the truly exalted objectives can be
achieved. A departure cannot be seen as anything less than an expression of
dissent -- and thus it is an insult and a heresy. Therefore a withdrawal from
the collective is an apostasy.
From
the beginning of the Orthodox era, being Orthodox essentially means living inside
an artificial crystal structure, a homogenous collective that views itself as
Orthodox. The degree of an individual's Orthodoxy is effectively equivalent to
the degree of his rejection of individual ideology, individual choice, and
individual perception of the world. Only in this sense and in this context can
we understand the Jewish propensity for orthopraxy (or rather the not
unreasonable tendency to replace orthodoxy with orthopraxy) - for life within a
collective is more practical than theoretical. Anyone who joins an Orthodox
collective leaves theory behind, like the hope abandoned upon entering Dante's
inferno. [3]
This is the only way to account for the enormous, disproportionate, seemingly
exaggerated role of minhagim (customs) both in theoretical halacha and
in the real life of Jewish communities (to the extent that is was decreed that
"the minhag of Israel is the Torah itself") -- for distinct
and more or less unique customs are a remarkably effective means of isolating
and consolidating a collective, transforming it into a crystal, a homogenous
autarky, much more successful than universal commandments. To precisely the
same extent the cause of Orthodoxy is facilitated by xenophobia, as natural as
breath, expressly directed against all those who place themselves outside the
collective, regardless of how close or remote from it they are. Thus it would
be worthwhile to redefine Jewish Orthodoxy as a life of loyalty -- to the
extent of annihilating the individual position both theoretical and practical
-- to the ideologically organized Jewish collective. This definition has added
usefulness due to the fact that other, non-Jewish orthodoxies evidently
function in a completely analogous manner.
Essentially,
it is all but irrelevant what exactly constitutes the worldview of an Orthodox
collective or whether it is consistent -- the only important requirement is
that it be sufficiently extensive, rigid and binding as a whole, and not too
complicated in individual cases. It is no wonder, therefore, that Orthodox
Jewish collectives are fairly numerous, with some of them as similar as two
peas in a pod, while others are strikingly different -- the distinct structural
similarity of closed societies does not at all preclude their profusion. It is
a tempting idea to design an Orthodox algebra whose aim would be to provide a
formal expression to the mutations undergone by these collectives. There is no
doubt that in this instance similarity clearly eclipses the differences.
On
the other hand, we should keep in mind that an Orthodox collective does not
spring up from just any social and ideological ground. On the contrary, certain
fairly simple concepts and realities effectively preclude Orthodoxy, possessing
immunity against it. Indeed, an Orthodox collective is essentially a community,
a tribe. Yet the very idea of a community (any community, not just an Orthodox
one) is fundamentally incompatible with real liberalism, functioning democracy,
pluralism -- in fact, with any form of social organization predicated on multiple
patterns of behavior and the possibility of individual choice. Thus by their
very definition there cannot be any pluralistic Orthodox collectives.
In
other words, it is by no means every social entity -- let alone every living
worldview -- that has the capacity to suppress the individual's unique,
non-collective core to a sufficient extent. Moreover, many concepts, once
assimilated, carry the germ of individualistic rebellion. Such are the liberal
political ideas and notions of individual freedom, the individual's right (not to mention duty) to rely on logic
and empirical reason, the refusal to confer on anyone the mantle of absolute
truth, and finally the conviction that man is entitled to personal,
unconstrained views whose nature he is not obliged to divulge to anyone -- or
simply the right to genuine privacy. To some extent, even the efficient system
of secret balloting is anti-Orthodox in its nature -- for any Orthodoxy has a
single candidate for any given post, and supporting this candidate is a sacred
duty. On the other hand, the countless collective responsibilities, the
opposition of the collective to both the world and the individual, the
anticipation of an impending miraculous redemption, the transcendental commandments,
the collective rituals, the traditional Halacha -- these are exactly what
Orthodoxy needs. I have deliberately left out of the discussion yet another
Orthodox effect: the almost ubiquitous, albeit not quite mandatory, tendency to
sanctify the community's leaders, often resulting in a cult of personality. In
fact, we are all acquainted with communities formed around charismatic
religious leaders who redefined collective customs or the nature of their
observance in their own fashion. In the case of the Jews, a wonderful example
of such communities is the Hassidic courts, but the Hasidim have no monopoly on
charismatic leadership. No Orthodox entity is immune to sects and sectarianism.
It
should be kept in mind that the deeply entrenched psychological and social
rigidity that marks the Orthodox society does not in any way prevent schisms
and the involuntary splintering of Orthodox sects and communities. Quite the
contrary: the Orthodox collective, having sworn an unwavering oath of loyalty
to itself, has no functional reason not to split in half, and then into four
parts, amoeba-like. One Orthodox amoeba or four -- it makes no difference. They
will prove vital and resilient in any case. After all, within the system, in
other words from the standpoint of a member of the Orthodox collective, this
revealing homomorphism changes nothing -- he continues to live in the only
righteous world. To be sure, the absence of an functional ban on division turns
the definition of Orthodox ideological unity from pathetic to a parody.
Be
it as it may, the Orthodox system -- like an amoeba -- looks rather dull when
considered from a bird's eye view. It has designed such an efficient system of
biological survival that the digestive organs now take up most of its body. It
is so simple and perfect that it is quite capable of self-propagation through
division, without resorting to outside help as required by more advanced
species. That is precisely why, counter to all ideology yet in full keeping
with functional logic, Orthodox collectives divide and propagate with such a
robust and single-minded zeal. The history of Hassidic courts and Lithuanian
yeshivas, the same as of Protestant churches, provides ample testimony of this
phenomenon.
This
being the case, the question that begs to be asked is how to classify, first,
the Modern Orthodox(MO) groups, and second,
those sundry individuals who, having left Orthodox communities, still appear to
remain Orthodox.
As
for the MO, we should first of all note the resolute hostility with which they
are regarded by the authentic Orthodox circles, Zionist and anti-Zionist alike.
They blame the MO for capitulating to the forces of liberalism and universalism
-- the most terrible charge that can be made from their standpoint as defenders
of the closed society. Yet what is actually behind this charge? To answer this
question, bare philology is not enough. The reason behind this Orthodox
antagonism towards the MO -- though it is rather transparent -- not only bears
out the above theory but also illustrates it in a highly instructive manner.
Indeed,
what it is that prevents authentic Orthodoxy from displaying a tolerant
attitude to the MO? Definitely not the fact that virtually all the MO receive a
secular education along with the communal Jewish one. True, this decadence in
itself may not be to the liking of the true Orthodox, yet they frequently
tolerate the presence of secularly educated Jews in their midst, and sometimes
even regard them as intellectual Shabbes goyim. Among the true Orthodox
one may find doctoral graduates from Princeton -- but never an MO.
Similarly,
the watershed between the MO and the Orthodox does not run along the issue of
acceptance or rejection of Zionism and the State of Israel -- nor, in fact,
along any formal political touchstones. Several decades ago this hypothesis,
mistaken though it may be, could have had at least some merit; today, however,
following the emergence of numerous Zionist Orthodox entities that bear an
uncanny resemblance to the classical anti-Zionist Hassidic courts in many of
their aspects, this hypothesis is simply inapplicable to anything.
Certainly
this has nothing to do with any kind of external or technical attribute of
religious conduct or with the attitude to rituals. Among the MO there are people
who wear fur hats and black gabardine coats, while some of the Orthodox don
jeans. As a matter of fact, a careful study of the chardal (Haredi
Zionist) Orthodox collectives leads to instructive and often unexpected
conclusions. It is also important to remember that where the techniques of
religious observance are concerned, many MO act exactly like the most zealous
pedants, while quite a few of the Orthodox have a fairly lax attitude to the
technical aspects of the Halacha.
Nor
would it be correct to draw the line at the "neophyte's" attitude to
Jewish eschatology, even though today it could be validated from the purely
empirical point of view (exactly as once happened with the political attitude
to Zionism). I personally know of one MO who is passionately awaiting the
Messiah and preparing for the war between Gog and Magog, as well as some
Orthodox Jews who do not give the Messiah a passing thought. It should be
admitted, however, that the majority of the Orthodox have always been entangled
in eschatology in one way or another. Nevertheless, the point of Orthodoxy does
not at all lie in eschatological tendencies; on the contrary, the latter should
be regarded as a traditional sauce to the gander of Orthodoxy. Today's mass
fascination with eschatology, though certainly fateful, is nevertheless
marginal and transient. For example, the eagerness of the Chabad movement to
see their late Rebbe as the Messiah (if not the Almighty himself) is still so
strong that quite a large number of the sect's followers ignore the fact of his
demise, and yet there is not the least doubt that the situation in Chabad will
go back to normal with time. In other words, this vigorous and vital movement
will not disappear because of its own eschatological escapades. What is more, if
need be it will elect a new rabbi without a second's hesitation, thereby
disavowing the previous one. When eschatology is confronted by the communal
survival instinct, mysticism does not stand a chance.
As
I have already noted above, the essence of orthodoxy is the declared domination
of the collective force over the individual, the individual's renunciation of
the right to set his own priorities and construct his own picture of the world
-- in a word, a virtually total dispersion in a clearly defined collective. To
an orthodox person, the collective cannot be wrong; what is more, value
categories such as truth and virtue cannot even exist outside the collective
area. For that reason orthodoxy may and should be compared to a beehive and an
anthill. The life of an orthodox person is akin to that of a bee or an ant;
practically all of his activity is circumscribed by collective rules, which may
be intended to attain collective objectives, to strengthen the inner harmony
(or discipline), or perhaps merely to demonstrate the collective essence of the
anthill or the beehive. Outside the collective life either does not exist at
all (a mere illusion, a chimera) or it is wretched and rotten. The bee and the
ant, in everything they do, invariably carry out the collective's policy, which
does not preclude them from spending a large part of the day outside the
beehive or anthill.
For
the orthodox bee/ant, there is no right to, or even an idea of, free choice in
any personal sense of the word. If
I am permitted to repeat the analogy of political elections, they always vote
-- exactly as was once done in the former USSR -- for a single candidate with a
hundred-percent majority. Any deviation from the rule is an act of sedition.
Essentially, the orthodox member of a collective entity invariably votes for
himself. The aforementioned single Soviet candidate was also elected or
appointed by someone -- the collective, in fact -- for the sole purpose of
basking in popular adulation. Any deviation from the unanimous majority, hinting
at individual opposition, was viewed as a transgression, a heresy, an offence
against orthodoxy.
Basically,
a refusal to see oneself as an ant or a bee is in effect a rejection of
orthodoxy. We daily encounter this fascinating phenomenon on the streets of
Jerusalem and Bnei Brak. Quite a few of our black-coated contemporaries make an
attempt to assume a prerogative that is completely forbidden to the Orthodox --
the prerogative of forming their own idea of the world around them, the right
to a personal opinion. This is the worst halachic transgression imaginable.
These people -- once caught in the act -- cease to be members of Orthodox
collectives; if never caught, they continue to function as such only in the
technical sense, and even then temporarily, only for as long as they continue
to attend their regular synagogue. They no longer accept the collective's
injunctions and priorities as irrefutable and automatically binding -- and
thereby they distance themselves from the collective. Thus a drop that penetrates
deep into solid rock does not behave as its integral part. A critically
thinking individual and an orthodox collective operate on different
frequencies, and are therefore incompatible.
What
we are witnessing today are broadly diverse and distinct Jewish groups merging
into sturdy Orthodox collectives on the basis of one Judaic value or another.
Their members conduct themselves just like the bees or the ants -- as parts of
a single collective whole. The attitude of these collectives to practical Halacha
may range widely, from total veneration to relative indifference. Nevertheless,
they all perfectly fit into the mosaic of Jewish Orthodoxy.
That
is why -- to sum it up -- there is no such thing as "free-roaming"
orthodox individuals, forming their own personal philosophies by gleaning them
from the countless texts written by people who lived in different times and
different collectives as well as from their own experience. To exactly the same
extent, the term "orthodox" does not apply to MO groups made up of
people who remember their collectives and rabbis only on Saturdays, and one
another on high holidays, and whose main link boils down to mutually specified
donations. "Where is your beehive, your anthill?" the God of Jewish
Orthodoxy will demand of the MO in the other world -- provided, of course, that
such a meeting takes place. The MO will answer in a hurt voice that he is not
an insect. And he will be right.
This
begs the question: if the MO have neither a beehive nor an anthill, then what
do they have in common? Are there any shared features that justify supplying
them with a meaningful label? Even more importantly, what exactly creates, if
not the collective unity of the MO, then at least the illusion of unity that
many of them enthusiastically embrace?
The
answer to these questions, though fairly simple, is at the same time logical
and instructive. In addition, it serves as a mute testimony to the patent
contemporaneousness of the MO phenomenon itself.
Indeed,
it is only the modern age with its lost ideological innocence that could have
given rise to the serious idea of finding a replacement for the discarded set
of orthodox collective concepts -- replacing one collective pattern with
another. This plan, insane and post-modernist in its core, could have succeeded
everywhere except in the orthodox world, which requires total collective
submission rather than mere collective consent.
At
its very inception (as early as the 19th century), the MO quite
consciously cast aside the Orthodox form of Jewish collective existence,
while retaining its formal content -- Halacha proper. All in all, this
was a rather naïve idea. To paraphrase a classical source, it is not the
observance of Shabbat as such that ensured the survival of the Orthodox Jew,
but rather its mystically collective nature; not kashrut it itself, but
rather its place in collective culture. Having become a matter of individual
choice for the MO, Halacha was transformed from the center of existence into a
voluntarily carried burden. This transformation was the natural and inevitable
result of the broad individual autonomy assumed by a MO person, of his critical
view of the world independent of collective concerns. Those who are capable of
peering through a telescope with an unbiased scientific eye or of classifying
Japanese paintings no longer regard their lives as an assortment of meaningful
collective rituals. At the most, they may remember those rituals at specially
designated moments, only to forget them with a sigh of relief afterwards. They
may be quite conscientious and even zealous in the performance of the rituals
themselves -- but those rituals no longer play a central -- let alone absolute
-- role in their existence.
The
relative emptiness of the MO's religious life and the corrupted nature of his
collective Jewish games did not pass unnoticed by others, or in fact by
himself. Since the MO only mimicked the Orthodox in their ritual activity,
their rituals' derivative nature was also quite noticeable. The relative
inadequacy of the MO ideology called for compensation -- and of course it was
not long in coming.
The
authentic, unadulterated collective Orthodox ideology was replaced by the MO
with Jewish nationalism -- which they had all but invented for that very
purpose -- followed by the national undertaking of building Zionism, or its
alternative: Jewish culture. Thus the MO finally came to possess something new
that the Orthodox never had; moreover, this innovation too had a collective,
national character, clearly meant to compensate for the lost collective
absolutism that was left behind with the community.
In
principle, an objective observer should have endorsed this gradual social
transition. The MO, having left the community, gained a nation -- albeit a
somewhat vague one -- along with a new form of social existence that was far
more in step with the times. However, we are equally interested in learning
about the price they have had to pay for all these innovations. Essentially, it
boils down to one thing only: the loss of collective unity, of the Jewish
"solid" body, and the departure from orthodoxy.
Indeed,
nationalism is a rather feeble substitute for tribal kinship, just as a
full-fledged nation is a far more diluted phenomenon than a common tribe. [4]
Nationalism, even in its zealous form, still leaves a person with a great deal
of free time and countless degrees of freedom. Orthodoxy, on the other hand,
swallows him whole. A nationalist is perfectly able to watch his neighbors with
interest and even envy; for the tribe or the clan, the external world as a
comparable phenomenon is virtually non-existent. A nationalist, from the
standpoint we are interested in, is no more than a cowboy playing an Indian. A
real Indian is an alien mystery to the cowboy; the life of an Indian -- filled
with symbols, symbolic in its core, and thus highly meaningful -- makes him
livid with envy. The problem is that the cowboy has no intention of moving into
a wigwam for the winter, while the Indian would not even think of accepting the
cowboy into the tribe. Or here is another simple analogy: a nationalist is like
a club member who sews the cherished club emblem on to a regular jacket bought
at a Marks and Spenser store. A genuine member of an Orthodox community wears
his gabardine coat, stockings and shtreimel (fur hat) on holidays; this
is his authentic uniform that cannot be found in shopping centers. He does not
need any special distinguishing marks or emblems -- for he is his own emblem.
Be
that as it may, nationalism is a far more watery phenomenon than tribal or
clannish solidarity, just as the collective qualities of a beehive are much
thicker than the mutual assistance of a flock. Since Orthodoxy is impossible
without the kind of natural tribal unity that an MO, like any nationalist, can
only dream of and hate, it is completely unattainable to him. In principle, he
should not feel resentful: social evolution has more than compensated him for
the losses incurred. Yet resentment is what he feels -- and for a good reason.
Let us call a spade a spade: not only is the MO not Orthodox -- he is the
walking antithesis of true orthodoxy with all the implications, including the
linguistic ones. After all, Modern Orthodoxy is the strangest term humanity has
managed to come up with. Even Postmodern Orthodoxy would have been a better
choice!
Now
we can proceed to the two eternal "suspended" questions: Does Halacha
truly undergo changes? Does an Orthodox Jew have the right to choose his own
points of view -- at least out of the ones that bear the stamp of Orthodox
approval? Suddenly these questions become quite manageable. From all that has
been said above, it is clear that Halacha cannot and must not change within a
living Orthodox collective -- or at the very least, it must not appear to
change. A hypothetical open and public change, binding on all the members of
the collective, will inevitably resemble an Orwellian retroactive rewriting of
history. Indeed, a new Halacha is fully as impossible as a new tradition --
precisely because of the universal and simultaneous nature of Orthodox
collective. Any Orthodox decree must be anchored in past authority, and thus
openly admit its retroactivity! In other words, just like in Carroll's books,
any new law must be declared old and time-honored and accepted as such. A
"halachic shift" that automatically transforms the community's
behavior, with all of its not quite traditional essence, must point at a
schematic replacement of halachic concepts rather than at a rearrangement of
communal consciousness. At the same time, an Orthodox system must change in a
communal, collective fashion. Contrary to the "Kuzari principle" [5],
Orthodox social evolution takes place without replacing the concepts -- by
psychologically refurbishing the tradition rather than tearing it down. Therefore
nothing real and significant in the Orthodox world happens through someone's
individual will or choice. Real changes must above all remain unnoticed,
unrecognized by the community. Only then can they be realized the way they are
realized -- gradually and slowly, one communal square at a time, spreading like
a chain reaction and systematically conquering the community. Halacha must
first and foremost seem immutable -- a rule that allows evolution but precludes
reform. Yet this same Halacha can easily change and even collapse during the
remaking -- as well as the splintering -- of the collective itself. This hardly
has any major significance for us. What is important is that a person cannot
remain Orthodox while choosing his own personal point of view concerning issues
of importance to the collective, and the basic theoretical presence of
different halachic opinions makes no difference in this matter. Any individual
point of view must at the same time be collective! All the rest is of no
account.
There
is no doubt that some Orthodox collectives permit polemics on a wide range of
issues. Polemics, however, is by no means the same as pluralism. Furthermore,
it is plainly considered from a narrow practical angle, as a sort of devil's
due, confined within rigidly established boundaries, and most importantly, can
only be theoretical. [6]
Can the Hassidic community be expected to seriously challenge a rebbe's
decision, or even to choose the cut of their coats? All in all, Orthodox
polemics may be denounced (Maimonides, for example, prohibited the Jews from
even thinking¸ let alone arguing, about metaphysical, historical and
halachic issues) or it may be allowed -- but always within certain confined
areas, and it is never left up to the individual's choice and preferences.
There is an interesting view to the effect that a true discussion can only be
conducted between collectives -- but even this does not solve all the problems
that arise. Since the process of meaningful discussion is indeterminate,
largely unpredictable and contains elements of creative spontaneity, a
seemingly harmless debate between communities is invariably either devoid of
context or dangerous. An argument as to whose caftan is godlier can either
reach a dead-end or suddenly escalate into an all-out conflict of a most
unexpected nature.
A
collective is not only able but even obligated to rigidly fix any halachic and
metaphysical positions it considers crucial. Ideological Orthodoxy is the sum
total of the positions it fixes. Anyone who rejects or even questions this
fixed pattern ceases to be a loyal member of the collective, as well as an
Orthodox Jew.
Known
examples of inner-confessional conflicts only go to support this conclusion.
For example, Maimonides, in defiance of the Talmud and the views espoused by
most of his contemporaries, denied the existence of evil spirits and many other
supernatural beings and phenomena. He also maintained that God had no corporeal
attributes and that any descriptions of God's body must be viewed as metaphoric
-- for which he was subjected to furious criticism, including threats of
excommunication. This and similar examples are often cited in support of the
possibility of free inner-confessional debate within Judaism. However, any
discussion, particularly a free one, requires that two conditions be met. One,
at least some of Maimonides' detractors had to belong to the community he
headed -- or he had to belong to the community headed by his opponents. Second,
the claims being questioned must be part of the tenets rigidly fixed by the
given Orthodox community. Alas, if at the time of Maimonides' stringent
leadership of Egypt's Jewish community any of his subjects were to declare that
he believed in evil spirits, he would have probably been severely punished for
heresy. On the other hand, issues such as evil spirits and God's corporeality
were clearly beyond the grasp of the overwhelming majority of community
members, and thus were not part of the typical list of its fixed tenets.
Moreover, Maimonides himself was threatened with excommunicated on several
occasions for his metaphysical speculations. Where punishment and
excommunication are the order of the day, there cannot be any free discussion.
Today,
the main Orthodox paradigm -- the paradigm of communal unity -- enables a broad
variety of Orthodox collectives to lead a parallel existence in every sense of
the word. Yet it is this paradigm that makes the Orthodox collective expel
anyone who tries to shape his own philosophy through the liberal means of
choosing bits from a variety of sources. Alas, Orthodoxy begins with total
fusion within the collective and ends with adoring loyalty towards it.
"Where is thy collective?" was the question God more likely asked of
Cain. Since Cain failed to come up with a satisfactory answer, he was punished
in the standard Orthodox fashion, by being banished from the collective.
To
be sure, the latter-day individualist too can try to find a collective to join.
In this endeavor, however, he will be facing two serious hurdles. First, he will
eventually be forced to do the last thing he wants -- to disarm himself before
the collective. On the other hand, the basic assumption on the part of the now
all-knowing individual of the right to make crucial decisions renders
meaningless the very search for a collective -- tomorrow will inevitably bring
new differences of opinion. Second, both the very idea of such a search and the
irritated ideological system that stands behind it -- rejecting thousands of
familiar version of collective Orthodoxy and yearning for version one thousand
and one -- are reminiscent of the Talmudic story about a typical dissident: the
man immerses himself in a ritual bath while grasping an insect in his fist,
making the act completely meaningless by definition, above all by the
definition of the mikve. In other words, the very idea of escaping Orthodoxy to
look for one is so redolent of liberal anti-Orthodox infection that it cannot
be rooted out without the use of strong antibiotics.
I
will not discuss the exact nature of the social and religious views held by the
MO and other emancipated Jewish renegades. Suffice it to say that they bear no
relation to Orthodoxy. I will point out, however, that it is precisely the
framework of discussing these views that justifies raising the issue of Jewish
metaphysics, an issue alien to Orthodoxy -- regardless of whether we consider
this phenomenon as positive or negative, original or derivative, living or
dead. I will add (by way of example) that the Ovadia Yosef we all know so well,
an indisputably authentic Orthodox leader, is an absolutely clean slate in
terms of metaphysics. What is more, he treats metaphysics -- whatever its
nature -- with alienation and antagonism. He is hardly capable of grasping the
subtleties of Platonic, Aristotelian and Kantian philosophy; though he has
certainly encountered these subtleties on more than one occasion, he
nevertheless rejects them outright. In principle this is a compliment,
something like an acknowledgement of Ovadia's sound common sense -- yet it
should not be taken too personally. More importantly, Ovadia's collective --
like the present-day rationalists -- has absolutely no use for metaphysics.
Sometimes extremes see eye to eye.
In
conclusion: we should keep in mind that the main goal of an Orthodox collective
is mutual support. Those who refuse to accept the primacy of the collective and
to live by its rules -- be they the peaceful MO or the inveterate loners --
present a direct threat to the Orthodox collective and are immediately expelled
(though not necessarily banished) from it.
In
any event, the MO are individualists who retain interest in Halacha. Any
collective they form cannot be Orthodox, if only because it is not a beehive.
The social and national adhesive that has replaced their Orthodox reflex has a
much weaker bonding power and it is therefore unable to generate any orthodoxy.
A collective of genuine MO is certainly an association of relatively free
people held together by the aforementioned pragmatic reasons or by mutual sympathy,
yet definitely not to the extent of a full Orthodox symbiosis. That is why the
MO do not join the Orthodox system; on the contrary, they exhibit a natural
resistance to it. However, this progressive privilege exhorts a steep price. An
MO can count on it that his grandson will not stand in the shoes of his
grandfather: he will either return to collective Orthodoxy and surrender
himself to its mercy or he will stop playing Jewish orthodox games altogether.
It is this fact that makes the MO un-Orthodox by definition, for the essence of
orthodoxy, its self-declared credo, consists of its ability -- or least hope --
of keeping grandfather and grandson in one collective. Yet to do this one must
learn to serve the collective rather than the other way around. And this
ability to serve -- naturally and unthinkingly, like the ants and the bees --
is something the MO can never learn. Why? For the sole reason that they have
only recently, and with considerable difficulty, unlearned this skill, to their
pride. Having once risen up against unthinking servitude they have finally
developed immunity against it. From the historical and evolutionary perspective
they have made the right choice. It is probably this that spells a Hegelian
death sentence to Orthodoxy. Yet the Orthodox God alone knows when and how this
sentence will ever be carried out.
[1]
Chevruta -- lit. a partner. This
refers to the ancient Jewish custom of studying the Talmud and related
disciplines in steady pairs, who read the book they study out loud. To this day
you will find many such pairs declaiming at the top of their lungs in the study
hall of any yeshiva -- naturally, during study hours the place is quite noisy.
[2]
I would like to stress that
the herd instinct as the cornerstone of a way of life is by no means a Jewish
invention or monopoly. The same herd instinct marked all ancient societies.
Even in ancient Greece or Rome man's entire life was spent "in public". Meals,
cultural activities, leisure, in fact every legitimate pastime took place in
the public eye (or at least as part of family rituals). Ancient cities and
houses, markets and public squares were all designed to celebrate and
perpetuate this collective spirit. Any deviation from the set standards and
scope of collective conduct, any attempt to escape into "private life", was
vigorously discouraged and sometimes punished. See Prof. G. Knabe's excellent
book History, Life and Culture of Ancient Rome.
[3] "Abandon hope all ye who
enter here."
[4]
That is why I fully
understand the calls to return to the shtetl (the only social
environment where "genuine" Jews can be completely themselves) coming from the
right-wing secular Jewish traditionalists. Still, understanding is not the same
as acceptance.
[5]
The "Kuzari principle" is a
set of instructive apologetic arguments that attempt to deduce the validity of
assertions made by classical Judaism from the fact that it declares the
universality of its epiphanies. Essentially, the Kuzari principle holds
communal memory to be infallible, and thus any reform unrealized by society to
be impossible. The acceptance of the Kuzari principle as such enables one to
prove the eternal nature of virtually any traditional scheme and consequently
it is practically useless from the theological standpoint. Nevertheless, it has
some merit in that it rejects the possibility of an "involuntary", unmotivated
and imperceptible social evolution. I gladly refer the reader to David Yust's work
"Kuzari -- the principle and the formalism", accessible on the Internet at http://www.talkreason.org/articles/kuzari.cfm.
[6] We should not be misled by
the stormy discussions about the proper times for the start or end of Shabbat
or issues related to kashrut. Debate of this sort is never intended to change
the customs prevailing in the given community -- they are safely beyond its
reach.
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