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The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing But the Truth?
Why Phillip Johnson's Darwin on
Trial and the "Intelligent Design" movement
are neither science--nor Christian
by Brian Spitzer
Posted on August 4, 2002
Discussion
Introduction
Darwin on Trial
Lawyer games
Just the facts, ma'am
How science isn't done
Did they really say that?
Colin Patterson
Steven Jay Gould
Nature on the British Museum of Natural
History
Tricks of the trade
Distortions and inventions
The tautology argument
The missing links which aren't, and
other examples
The log in your own eye
Selective use of evidence
The moving target
Johnson's response
Conclusions
Additional examples
Bait-and-switch
Selective use of evidence
Ad hominems and innuendo
Misrepresentations of science
Quote mining
Begging the question
"Straw man" arguments
Conspiracy theory
Discussion
Lawyers are not the best-respected professionals in our society.
Being a lawyer gives one a certain prestige because law requires
expertise, like medicine or science, but we tend to put lawyers in
the same shady box as salesmen and politicians. We don't
trust them. And--perhaps--there are good reasons not to.
Courtroom lawyers are called upon to represent the guilty as often
as the innocent, and they are duty-bound to build the best case
that they can. It follows logically that a courtroom lawyer will
spend half of his or her time trying to convince a jury of the
truth; the other 50% of the time, they are trying to persuade the
jury to believe something which isn't the truth.
This is not only permissible in the courtroom, it's necessary
for our justice system to work. It's ironic that a system of
justice requires what could be called 'injustice' from
its participants, but that's what the law demands: lawyers
playing parts which they may not even believe. Our law dictates
that even the guilty should be represented in court, and most of us
would agree that this curious tangle of competing fictions turns
out to make our justice system more just. Because of this, it is
entirely acceptable for a lawyer to play his or her false part in
court, just as it is acceptable for an actor to play someone
fictional on the stage. But when people assume false identities
offstage, we call them impostors. I would argue that when a lawyer
plays lawyer games outside the courtroom, it is just as morally
wrong.
Of course, you can't have a debate without
having debating tactics. It's entirely fair, inside the courtroom or out,
to showcase the facts that are most favorable to you. In the
same way, it's perfectly fair to write a radio ad pointing out that
your brand of widgets is cheaper and more reliable than
your competitor's--if those favorable facts are actually true. But we're all
aware of sleazy sales pitches where the tactics are used to
obscure or distract attention from the relevant facts. I am not
claiming that the line between these two is crystal-clear. But I am
claiming that those who try to sway public opinion--especially if they
are laying claim to the moral mantle of Christianity--are ethically
bound to stick to the fair methods and leave the lawyer games in
court.
Darwin on Trial, the book by Phillip Johnson which founded the
neocreationist movement of "intelligent design", was
written in 1991. I first encountered it in 1996. At the time I knew
nothing at all about creationism. A friend--like me, a serious
Christian as well as a scientist--suggested that I take a look
at it, and I was curious enough to do so. There are certainly
things about the book which I applauded, at the time. I've
always been irritated by pop-science works which try to make
statements about God (or the lack thereof) as though these
statements are supported by scientific fact, and I was glad to see
someone taking on Richard Dawkins. But even without much training
(I had only a B.A. in biology), while reading through
Johnson's book I began to notice some puzzling things. At
first, they were quite small: a claim in one place which
contradicted a different claim in another. A strange lapse of
logic-perhaps excusable on account of the author's
inexpertise? Statements which didn't fit with what I knew
firsthand about science and scientists.
I was naive. I assumed that a Christian writing to other Christians
would provide a scrupulously fair and accurate account of the
facts.[1] But the deeper
I got into Darwin on Trial, the less naive I became. And the
clearer it became that the driving force behind Johnson's book was
neither fairness nor accuracy.
A few years passed with this troubling thought at the back of my
mind. I entered graduate school and started doing real science
myself. And, the more I learned, the less I trusted Darwin on
Trial. I finally challenged myself to put my mistrust to the
test. Perhaps Johnson was merely confused about some things. What I
should do, I told myself, is look at the sources he actually used
in writing Darwin on Trial, and see what they say. Perhaps
part of what Johnson says is accurate; perhaps his sources misled
him in places. So I went to the campus library and started checking
his claims.
I was a lot less naive when I finished that task. I found that
almost every scientific source cited by Johnson had been misused
or distorted, in ways ranging from simple misinterpretations and
innuendos to the construction of what appears to be outright
fiction. The more closely I examined Darwin on Trial,
the more inaccuracies I found, until it became almost impossible to
catalogue all of the misleading statements in Johnson's work.
This book-upon which the "intelligent design"
movement is trying to hang a program of social reform and public
education-is perhaps the ugliest and most deceptive book I
have ever seen.
It may seem irrelevant to critique a book over a decade since it
was published. But Darwin on Trial was the work which
founded the "intelligent design" movement, and Phillip
Johnson is still regarded as the "godfather" of that
entire school of thought. Later "intelligent design"
creationists have adopted many of his exact arguments, as well as
many of the questionable tactics and strategies used in Darwin
on Trial. Perhaps most importantly, nobody in the
"intelligent design" movement has, to my knowledge,
ever criticized or disavowed any of the claims in Darwin on
Trial. As I will show, this book is so full of questionable
tactics that it would be hard for any informed reader not to
notice any of the inaccuracy. All of the stars of the
"intelligent design" movement, by their silent approval
of these tactics, stand under a cloud of suspicion at the very
least.
Many Christians have welcomed the "intelligent design"
creationists in the belief that they are fighting for God and
truth. But, as the televangelism scandals of the 1980's
should remind us, there are some more unsavory reasons for seeking
celebrity in the Christian community: money, fame, applause, or
power, especially political power. In short, there are a wealth of
reasons why Christians need to be careful about trusting the stars
of the "intelligent design" movement. And even
well-intentioned debaters, if they let their desire to win the
argument outstrip their respect for the facts, will turn out a
product which is grossly misleading. Integrity is important.
If--as I will show in this essay--the claims of
"intelligent design" are more a product of debating
tactics and tricks than they are a fair and honest presentation,
Christians need to seriously consider whether they can support this
movement in good faith.
To understand a lawyer's book, talk to another lawyer.
Darwin on Trial has been reviewed by, among other people, a
practicing lawyer by the name of Thomas C. Sager. In his review,
Sager makes some very interesting points about the legal profession
which he and Johnson share. He puts it succinctly: "The job
of a lawyer is not to find the truth, (that is the job of the judge
or jury) but to defend (or prosecute) the client.... The standard
is to vigorously argue on behalf of one's client, rather than
to pursue an abstract 'truth' or even
'justice'." Sager goes on to note: "In
supporting the client, the lawyer may use any ethical means
available. It is perfectly ethical for a lawyer to make ad
hominem attacks on the opposing witnesses, to present
incomplete information to a jury, to bring in irrelevant data, and
of course to use a wide panoply of rhetorical skills and tricks.
Science, obviously, has different goals. But the lawyer's
orientation should be kept in mind when analyzing Johnson's
book, because he is a lawyer, he has titled his subject a trial, he
pursues it as a trial, and his job is to prosecute Darwinism. Lots
of things are 'fair', from his point of view."[2]
Johnson might protest that none of these tactics--ad
hominem arguments, half-truths, and rhetorical
sleight-of-hand--are technically lies. I am not
interested in quibbling over fine shades of meaning in such
definitions; in my view, deliberately misleading people does not
become more acceptable because it goes under a different name. To a
certain extent, it does not even matter whether these inaccuracies
are deliberate or not. If Johnson is being intentionally
misleading, that is an ethical and intellectual crime. If he is
merely letting a desire to attack evolutionists override his
concern for careful and accurate research, that indifference to
fairness is also a crime, though a lesser one. In either case,
Darwin on Trial cannot safely be trusted at face value as a
guide to the facts.
Phillip Johnson, perhaps even by his own admission, is not terribly
interested in facts. Indeed, the heart of the argument against
evolution which is presented in Darwin on Trial--and
echoed throughout the "intelligent design" movement up
until the present day--is that science isn't actually
about facts. According to Darwin on Trial, it's
about "ideology." The accusation is that evolutionary
scientists are all hopelessly biased, wedded to an atheistic
ideology, and that the only reason they support evolutionary theory
is that they need some way to explain the marvels of biology
without bringing up God.
This is a clever strategy, because a number of well-known and
outspoken scientists are in fact atheists, and the Christian
community in America has long had a vein of simmering resentment
against a few individuals, like Richard Dawkins, who have
preached atheist ideology while calling it science. Johnson taps
into this vein skillfully, claiming that "Darwinism" is
not only the view that natural forces created biology as we see it
today, but also the insistence that God is a mere fable, uninvolved
in evolution or--for that matter--anything else.
The problem is that this argument isn't true. The truth is
that biologists are overwhelmingly convinced that the theory of
evolution really does explain the natural world accurately.
That's why they support it, not some "ideology."
Johnson and the other "intelligent design" creationists
are aware that a large number of evolutionists maintain a deep
faith in God. However, if the "intelligent design"
creationists acknowledged them, they would have to admit that there
are other reasons besides ideology to agree with the theory of
evolution. Their strategy has been to deny that these people exist.
A Gallup poll conducted in 1982 [3] found that only about 10% of Americans think that
"Man evolved over millions of years from less developed
forms. God had no part in this process." 90% of us, then,
reject "Darwinism" as Johnson defines it, and the
"intelligent design" creationists are fond of quoting
this statistic. What they avoid mentioning is the other half of the
poll, in which Gallup went not to the average American but to the
average American scientist. About 40% of scientists declared their
belief in both evolution and in an actively intervening God
very much in control of the process. Either 40% of the scientists
in America are fighting tooth and nail in defense of an ideology
which they actually reject, or--based on the very poll
which Johnson likes to cite--Johnson's argument about
ideology is bunk.
There is plenty of other evidence suggesting that Johnson should
know this argument to be just that: bunk. Upon reading through the
sources cited in Darwin on Trial, I found that the
distinction between science and atheism was drawn quite clearly on
a number of occasions It is made repeatedly by theologian Langdon
Gilkey (Creationism on Trial, pp.34-35, 97, 175-176)[4] and scientist Douglas
Futuyma (Science on Trial, p.217)[5], both of whom are cited by Johnson. While
Darwin on Trial points out that evolutionists like Dawkins,
Julian Huxley, and Steven Jay Gould claim or imply that God is
dead, it neglects to mention that all these figures have been
criticized harshly and publicly by evolutionary biologists
for muddying the line between scientific conclusions and
metaphysical preferences. Johnson has a ready excuse: he
claims that any time scientists say that they are not atheists, it
is only to fool the public--or, as he puts it in one of his
nastier moments, "for fear of jeopardizing the funding for
scientific research" (p.127). However, Darwin on Trial
gives no evidence to back up this accusation. That's because
no such evidence exists. If Johnson wants to convince us that his
accusations of atheism are not just conspiracy theory, he has had
plenty of opportunity to do so. Several reviews of his book have
criticized him for pretending that the personal views of a few
inflammatory scientists are the consensus view of the scientific
community, but Johnson has made no attempt to correct his claims or
provide evidence for them. To my knowledge, neither have any of the
other leaders of "intelligent design" creationism.
There can be no denying it: stereotypes are rhetorically handy. But
they aren't honest. The attempts by a few scientists to
clothe their personal philosophies in the authority of science are
certainly deplorable, and I believe that Christians are right to
deplore them. But is the correct response to meet one mistruth with
another?
The way science works--methodological naturalism, to call it
by its highbrow name [6]--is to try to explain the world in terms of ideas
which can be empirically tested. The tests can be experimental, or
one may posit an hypothesis and then look for those empirical signs
which would follow logically if that hypothesis were true.
Johnson's strategy is to claim that this is the same as
atheism (see, for example, pp.116-117 of Darwin on Trial).
This argument does not stand up for long under scrutiny. We may not
call it by such an elaborate name, but when a plumber tries to find
out why your sink is clogged, or when police try to solve a crime,
or when an engineer tries to design a bridge--in fact,
whenever anyone tries to figure out pretty much anything about the
physical world we live in--they are using methodological
naturalism. You yourself use it every day. So do the
"intelligent design" creationists.
Scientists aren't precommitted to atheism. They're
precommitted to a scientific method that can actually work. The
only alternative to methodological naturalism--that is, to
trying to understand the world in terms of ideas which can be
empirically tested--is to try to understand the world in terms
of ideas which can't be tested at all. See if you can unclog
your sink that way.
Johnson should, by now, be painfully aware that this argument does
not hold up. He has been challenged clearly and publicly (for
instance, by Robert Pennock)[7] to present a working alternative to methodological
naturalism. Despite the fact that he has had over a decade to work
out a method for what he calls "theistic science",
Johnson has had nothing to say. Writes Pennock: "This is not
surprising, for he has consistently refused to say anything
positive about how a theistic science is supposed to work."
If Johnson really feels that scientists have other options--if
we really do have a choice other than methodological naturalism in
science--he should give us a hint about what those options
are. Until the intelligent design creationists explain to
scientists what other methods they could be using, I find it very
hard to blame the scientists for considering methodological
naturalism to be a limited but indispensable tool.
Darwin on Trial misrepresents science just as it
misrepresents scientists. Johnson seems to suggest that any event
which has not been directly observed may be dismissed as
"pure philosophy", but inferential
evidence-as he should know from law-can prove a point
as well as direct observation. Essentially all modern
science, including particle physics, astrophysics, geology,
microbiology, and chemistry, relies on inferential evidence. He
claims that scientists disagree over "every detail" of
evolutionary theory, but Douglas Futuyma, on p.171 of Science on
Trial (again, a book cited in Darwin on Trial) explains
accurately and clearly what is and is not in dispute in the
scientific community. On p.30 of Darwin on Trial, Johnson
dismisses evolutionary mechanisms such as developmental constraints
and pleiotropy--despite the fact that they are proven, genuine
mechanisms that are not only compatible with Darwinian theory but
are practically logical outgrowths of it. Darwin on Trial
claims on pp.72-73 that, because developmental processes are
different in different classes of tetrapods, the resulting traits
cannot be homologues of one another; but this is only true if
evolution adheres strictly to the principle of recapitulation
[8], a principle which was
rejected decades ago by modern science. It suggests on p.80 that
Archaeopteryx is just a mosaic along the lines of the
platypus (it isn't); suggests on p.94 that the isolation of
present-day taxa is at odds with the theory of evolution (this is
incorrect); and on pp.95-96 claims that neutral theory is
incompatible with Darwinian theory (a conclusion soundly rejected
in at least one paper actually cited on the subject in
Darwin on Trial)[9]. After examining the sources which Johnson himself used in
writing Darwin on Trial, I find it very difficult to
understand how a writer with a serious concern for fairness could
have reached the conclusions which are stated in Darwin on
Trial.
Serious misunderstandings of science pervade Darwin on
Trial. For example, Johnson suggests that all scientists stick
to the Darwinist party line out of self-interest--apparently
unaware that scientific careers are made not by conformity but by
coming up with radical new ideas. Any working scientist could have
told him that. He does not understand basic scientific terminology
(such as the word "tentative", for example, an error
which he has not corrected even after being informed of it), or how
the "self-correcting" nature of the scientific
enterprise works. Many of these misunderstandings are so basic that
Johnson seems to have done little or no research on the topic. In
short, rather than do the work involved in understanding how
science actually works, Johnson apparently made up a picture of
modern biology which he finds useful for rhetorical purposes. Is
this really the sort of work on which a true intellectual movement
can be founded? Is this the sort of ethics with which the Christian
community wants to ally itself?
a. Colin Patterson
Most damning of all is the way in which Darwin on Trial
represents the views of other individuals. In several cases,
Johnson cites the published opinions of scientists on various
matters; it is therefore possible to set his book side-by-side with
the original statements and see if they match up. Time and time
again, they do not. Even on a generous reading of the material, and
even granting that Johnson may have misunderstood the more
technical writing, there is in my judgment absolutely no honest
way to read those original sources and represent them as
Johnson has. It is hard to know whether Johnson simply neglected to
read his sources with any sort of care, or whether he actually
chose to misrepresent them; in either case, these
misrepresentations say a great deal about the credibility of Darwin
on Trial.
Johnson claims at several points in Darwin on Trial that
evolutionists, while they keep up a solid public front, are
secretly unconvinced by the modern theory of evolution. In his
first chapter, Johnson says that scientist Colin Patterson
disavowed the theory of evolution in a speech at the American
Museum of Natural History in 1981. Specifically, Johnson says:
"according to Patterson, Darwin's theory of natural
selection is under fire and scientists are no longer sure of its
general validity." (p.9); "Patterson suggested that
both evolution and creation are forms of pseudo-knowledge, concepts
which seem to imply information but do not." (p.10);
"'Evolution' can mean anything from the
uncontroversial statement that bacteria 'evolve'
resistance to antibiotics to the grand metaphysical claim that the
universe and mankind 'evolved' entirely by purposeless,
mechanical forces. A word that elastic is likely to mislead, by
implying that we know as much about the grand claim as we do about
the small one. That very point was the theme of a remarkable
lecture given by Colin Patterson at the American Museum of Natural
History in 1981." (p.10); and states that the point of this
lecture was that "a fact of evolution is vacuous unless it
comes with a supporting theory" (p.12). Johnson reluctantly
supplied me with a transcript of this speech. Upon reading it, I
found that the speech was not about the theory of evolution at all.
The theory of evolution is barely mentioned in passing.
What the speech was actually about was systematics, the arcane art of
giving names to organisms. In the early 1980's, there were two schools
of thought which clashed strongly on how to assign such names. Patterson
championed one school of thought, called "pattern cladism." Adherents to
pattern cladism felt that patterns of shared characters were the only
important factors in assigning names to groups. For example, they would
consider "mammals" a valid group because they share features such as
hair, live birth, and mammary glands. The other school of thought was
"evolutionary taxonomy", which argued that important evolutionary
developments should be the basis of naming groups of organisms. An
evolutionary taxonomist would put special emphasis on the evolution of
warm-bloodedness and feathers in birds, and make "birds" a separate
group from "reptiles." A pattern cladist would note that birds share
more features with some reptiles than those reptiles do with other
reptiles, and conclude that "birds" should really be a subgroup of the
Reptilia. Even though one school was called "evolutionary taxonomy", it
should be pointed out that the cladists in no way rejected Darwinian
theory. In fact, doing cladistic systematics would be utterly pointless
if the organisms in question hadn't evolved
from a common ancestor. The pattern cladists simply felt that
evolutionary history wasn't all that relevant to the names tacked onto different groups of
organisms.
Patterson's speech is not about the folly of evolutionary theory; it is about the folly of evolutionary
taxonomy. Patterson has said so publicly: he
is on record as saying that the 1981 speech "concerned systematics,
nothing else." Patterson's views on evolution itself can perhaps best be demonstrated from
the textbook he wrote (titled, appropriately enough, Evolution).[10] In the
introduction he states: "evolution is about what Darwin called 'descent
with modification'--it concerns the idea of common or shared ancestry and
the belief that all species are related by descent. I think that belief
is now confirmed as completely as anything can be in the historical
sciences." (Johnson cites this book in Darwin on
Trial, so it is hard to argue that he is not aware of Patterson's
real views.) I read Patterson's speech and his book closely. In neither
of them is there any statement, express or implied, that Patterson
considered the theory of evolution to be "pseudo-knowledge"; there is no
discussion whatsoever of evolutionary theory being "vacuous", and the
quote from Evolution plainly shows that
Patterson soundly affirms the general validity of evolutionary theory.
Patterson is firm in insisting that names should be assigned to groups
of organisms on the basis of shared characters rather than on inferences
about their evolutionary history, but this is rather different from
saying that evolutionary biology has no content!
Simply put, Johnson took a few sentences from Patterson's speech
and placed them in a different context, where they appeared to state
something which their author did not intend--indeed, where they appeared
to state something which their author has publicly rejected as a valid interpretation of
his views.[11]
b. Steven Jay Gould
On p.11, Darwin on Trial contains a quote
from paleontologist Steven Jay Gould, presented in a fashion which is
similarly misleading. In this quote, Gould states that the neo-Darwinian
synthesis, "as a general proposition, is effectively dead, despite its
persistence as textbook orthodoxy." Anyone reading this section of Darwin on Trial will unavoidably go away with
the impression that Gould is renouncing evolutionary theory. This in and
of itself should make one suspicious that Gould's words are being
misused, since Gould has been one of the most visible defenders of
evolutionary theory in the modern era.
When I read Gould's actual article [12], I found that
the first part of that sentence--omitted by Johnson--makes clear that
Gould wasn't referring to all of evolutionary theory. Gould's true
opinion is that "if [biologist Ernst] Mayr's characterization of the
synthetic theory is accurate, then that theory, as a general
proposition, is effectively dead, despite its persistence as textbook
orthodoxy." What is Mayr's view that Gould is denouncing? Gould cites
Mayr clearly: "The proponents of the synthetic theory maintain that all
evolution is due to the accumulation of small genetic changes, guided by
natural selection, and that transspecific evolution is nothing but an
extrapolation and magnification of the events that take place within
populations and species." It is this last phrase in particular to which
Gould is taking exception. Gould goes on to argue that the gradualism,
reductionism, and panselectionism championed by Mayr are unnecessary and
possibly incorrect. If this were pointed out publicly, Johnson might
respond by saying that the disagreement between Gould and Mayr was about
the fundamentals of the theory of evolution, but Gould's article
emphasizes that this is not the case: "None of this evidence, of course,
negates the role of conventional selection and adaptation in molding
parts of the phenotype with obvious importance for survival and
reproduction. Still, it rather damps Mayr's enthusiastic claim for 'all
evolution... guided by natural selection.' The question, as with so many
issues in the complex sciences of natural history, becomes one of
relative frequency. Are the Darwinian substitutions merely a surface
skin on a sea of variation invisible to selection, or are the neutral
substitutions merely a thin bottom layer underlying a Darwinian ocean
above? Or where in between?" Note that, by Darwinian, Gould means
exclusively those changes due to natural selection; there is not, of
course, anything about neutral variations (those variations "invisible
to selection") which contradicts evolutionary theory. Nor are
gradualism, reductionism, or panselection necessary elements of the
theory.
Gould's article, therefore, is not criticizing
anything central to the theory of evolution. There is nothing in this
article to suggest that Gould considers evolutionary theory in general to
be "effectively dead", and nothing Gould has written before or since
supports Johnson's claim that Gould has renounced evolution. The simpler
explanation is that Johnson found it useful to portray Gould's views
inaccurately, just as a lawyer in court may find it useful to twist a
witness' words.
c. Nature on the British
Museum of Natural History
Yet another striking example of distortion
concerns a series of letters and editorials in the journal Nature about the British Museum of Natural
History, discussed in Darwin on Trial on
pp.135-142. Johnson's story is this: an exhibit opened at the BMNH
questioning the validity of the theory of evolution. After a biologist,
Beverly Halstead, wrote to Nature to denounce
this "heresy", a firestorm of letters erupted, with evolutionists
admitting publicly that they really weren't convinced by Darwinian theory.
The story ends with the exhibit being "cleaned up" and the dissent
suppressed.
I read all of the letters and editorials cited in
Darwin on Trial, as well as all other letters
about the BMNH published in Nature during that
period. The real story has almost nothing to do with the conspiracy theory
Johnson presents. The "substantial issue", as Johnson puts it, was not
that the Museum was going public with doubts about evolution or
evolutionary theory. The Museum never did anything of the kind. What
Halstead's letter objected to was the fact that the Museum, under Colin
Patterson's influence, had organized its exhibit around the principles of
cladism. Halstead--a paleontologist who disliked the cladistic method for
naming organisms--believed that, because not all of the scientific
community accepted cladism, it was inappropriate for the Museum to present
cladism as though it represented the views of all biologists. Halstead
likens cladists to creationists, but not because cladists are
antievolutionists, as Darwin on Trial implies.
(In fact, most evolutionary biologists working today are cladists!)
Halstead makes the comparison because cladists assume (for convenience)
when arranging organisms in groups that no organism in that group is a
direct ancestor of any other. Creationists who insist on the separate
creation of man and other animals also insist on an absence of ancestry
when considering hominid fossils and modern humans, but the resemblance
stops there.
Halstead's letter appeared in
Nature on November 20 of 1980.
Darwin on Trial suggests that the entire exchange
of letters called into doubt the validity of the theory of evolution, but
the topic of the "validity of Darwinism" doesn't even come up until
February 26, three months later. At that point, an editorial in Nature noted that the Museum's exhibit included
the phrase "If the theory of evolution is true..." and commented that,
since the theory of evolution is not in dispute among serious biologists,
the use of such a phrase could only serve to confuse visitors.
According to Johnson's story, the next
editorial-entitled "How true is the theory of evolution?"--admitted that
biologists were not confident in the theory. It did no such thing. The
article wasn't about the validity of the theory of evolution or any other
theory. It was about what scientists mean when they say that a theory is
"true." Technically, no scientific theory can ever be completely proven.
The best modern example of this is the fact that the entire edifice of
Newtonian physics was found by Einstein to be wrong--"untrue"--even after
engineers used it successfully to land manned spacecraft on the moon.
(Clearly, a scientific theory can be remarkably correct and still be
"untrue".)
Because all scientific theories are technically
unproven, no theory, be it germ theory, atomic theory, Einstein's theory
of relativity, or even the theory that the earth is round, can be called
"true." Placing the theory of evolution alongside these other unproven
theories hardly suggests that scientists are in doubt about it.
The editorial goes on to say that the BMNH should
be careful to clarify for the public the difference between scientific
objections to evolutionary theory and objections with no scientific basis.
Darwin on Trial claims that this article
"implied that Darwinism is a metaphysical system sustained partly by
faith" (p.139). This is false. The editorial noted that philosopher of
science Karl Popper classified the theory of evolution,
and all other theories about past events, as
"metaphysical" since they cannot be confirmed by
direct observation, but there is no suggestion
whatsoever that the editorial writer considered the theory of evolution
lacking in empirical support. Consider the following excerpts from the
editorial: "Darwinism is consistent with the data to which Darwin had
access more than a century ago. One of the remarkable features of the
theory is that it remains consistent with the vastly greater body of data
now available."; "The result [of the new science of molecular biology] is
a striking confirmation of the general character of the relationships
suggested by Darwin and his contemporaries."; "...the way in which the
theory of evolution has been able to survive such a long succession of
discoveries bearing on the mechanism of inheritance--the rediscovery of
Mendelism, the discovery of chromosomes, the recognition of what genes are
and the recognition that genes are usually pieces of doubleanded
DNA-is striking evidence of its overwhelming consistency. No theory of
such a grand scope in the physical sciences has done as well in the past
century." Most telling is the fact that Johnson knows what Popper meant by
the term "metaphysical"--it is actually discussed on pp.150-151 of Darwin on Trial. He cannot, therefore, claim that
this misrepresentation was an accident.
Johnson's representation of Halstead's original
letter is false; his claim that "the Museum's staff was 'going public'
with doubts about neo-Darwinism and even the existence of fossil
ancestors-doubts that had previously been expressed only in professional
circles" is false; his claim that "the editors of
Nature belatedly discovered that Darwinism is
more controversial among scientists than they had realized" is not
supported anywhere by
anything in the series of letters and editorials.
Basically, Johnson has taken quotes out of context and out of order from
the series of letters and editorials, and reassembled them as part of a
completely different story which happens to support his position.
The three examples cited above are only a few of
many instances in which Johnson has taken quotes from scientific sources
and placed them in a different context so that they seem to say something
which is completely unsupported, if not actually contradicted, by the original material. Such a
practice violates not merely standards of academic accuracy but basic,
everyday ethics.
a. Distortions and inventions
In Johnson's book Defeating Darwinism, he exhorts his readers to
examine claims critically. However, the research underlying Darwin on Trial is neither careful nor critical,
and I would submit that it is not worthy of any true intellectual
movement. Johnson's arguments distort scientific views in the same way
that they distort scientists' words. For example, he notes that, when
Darwin first wrote The Origin of Species, he
made his case for natural selection by making an analogy to a more
well-known practice: artificial selection, the process by which breeders
have been able to produce wide varieties of domesticated animals and
plants (p.17). Johnson then writes: "The analogy to artificial selection
is misleading. Plant and animal breeders employ intelligence and
specialized knowledge to select breeding stock and protect their charges
from natural dangers. The point of Darwin's theory, however, was to
establish that purposeless natural processes can substitute for
intelligent design." This misrepresents the point of the analogy. It's
true that Darwin's overall theory states that
natural processes can create the apparent "purpose" and "design" in living
organisms-but that's not the point Darwin was making with the analogy to
artificial selection. The remarkable variety of forms produced by
artificial selection merely illustrates the fact that, over many
generations, organisms can be changed quite radically without huge jumps.
The analogy is about process, not purpose.[13]
Another type of distortion comes on p.66, where
Johnson pretends that "Darwinists assume that the relationship between,
say, bats and whales is similar to that between siblings and cousins in
human families." This is not an assumption but a conclusion drawn from
various lines of evidence, including fossils, molecular data,
biogeography, and present-day comparative studies. The theory of common
descent predicts that similarities and differences among species should be
arranged in particular patterns; these predictions have been confirmed in
striking detail.
One type of distortion which deserves special
mention is the way in which Darwin on Trial
deals with uncertainty in science. Often, Johnson cites a small
uncertainty, or an unknown detail, and claims that the uncertainty is
enormous and that the detail is actually a fundamental part of
evolutionary theory. On p.19 he claims that "selective change is limited
by the inherent variability in the gene pool." He allows that "It might
conceivably be renewed by mutation, but whether (and how often) this
happens is not known." There is much that is unknown about the processes
of mutation, especially as they relate to the generation of variation upon
which selection can work, but Johnson would have you believe that the
uncertainty is much greater than it is. The evidence that variation
recharges naturally is quite strong--if it didn't, natural populations
couldn't have any variation at all for many traits--and in most cases it is
hard to imagine a process which could possibly
stop that variation from recharging.
In many cases, instead of presenting
well-researched facts, Johnson substitutes what are apparently his own
opinions or biases, unsubstantiated by any research. For example, on p.17,
Johnson claims that Darwin's analogy to artificial selection, made in the
Origin of Species, was accepted by scientists
in Darwin's day only because the "receptive audience for the theory was
highly uncritical." No historical work or history of science is cited in
the research notes for this assertion. Furthermore, this assertion is
contradicted by everything I have ever read on the topic. Darwin's theory
was immediately subjected to fierce criticism from all sides, according to
every historical sketch I have seen.
Similarly, Darwin on
Trial claims that mutations are always harmful, never useful (p.17), a
claim which is contradicted by a vast body of scientific research, and for
which Johnson's research notes cite no supporting evidence. On p.18 Darwin on Trial states that natural selection is
only conservative and that "there are definite limits to the amount of
variation that even the most highly skilled breeders can achieve." No
sources are cited for either of these claims, which are not supported by
any scientific fact that I know of. Johnson's suggestions that species
lack sufficient genetic capacity for major changes is flatly contradicted
by the evidence: in Science on Trial, on p.117
(Johnson actually quotes a different passage from this very page), Futuyma cites experiments which selected
for alteration of species "well beyond its original range of variation",
and notes that researchers have been able to select for entirely new
traits. It is not clear where Johnson got any of these claims that he is
making. Certainly none of them are supported by his sources.
b. The tautology argument
Population genetics is the study of how gene
frequencies in a theoretical population change in response to various
natural mechanisms, such as selection, drift, assortative mating, and so
on. Population genetics essentially asks the question, "If evolution by
natural selection happens, what is the behavior of a population under
these circumstances?" Of course, since these are theoretical populations
only, there is no mechanism behind selection in these mathematical models.
In real life, say in a population of hawks, there is a reason why a gene will spread through the
population--for example, it might confer slightly keener eyesight on its
bearer, or more efficient flight. In the imaginary realm of population
genetics, though, "fitness" is not the outcome of particular traits as it
is in the real world; "higher fitness" just means that this hypothetical
allele has been assigned a higher probability of "reproducing" than some
other hypothetical allele. As population geneticists will freely admit,
this mechanism-free way of thinking about fitness is tautological--"the
survival of the fittest" among these theoretical genes merely means "the
survival of the ones that survive." Of course, biologists working with
real organisms think about fitness in terms of mechanisms, but on p.22,
Johnson claims that the way of thinking of fitness in population genetics
"spread to the zoologists and paleontologists, who found it convenient to
assume that their guiding theory was simply true by definition. As long as
outside critics were not paying attention, the absurdity of the tautology
formulation was in no danger of exposure." The statement that zoologists
and paleontologists "found it convenient to assume that their guiding
theory was simply true by definition" is a fiction. Johnson either has not
read or chooses to ignore the thousands of papers published by
evolutionists who have gone to great lengths to test the theory of evolution rather than assume
its accuracy--not to mention the fact that the theory of evolution had
already been confirmed by several decades of zoology and paleontology
before the population geneticists came up with their abstract
populations.
On a related topic, on p.97, Johnson also
seriously misrepresents the views of Motoo Kimura on neutral evolution.
Kimura has argued that two or more different alleles at a given locus may
have essentially the same effect on the survival and reproduction of an
organism,[14] and that they may therefore
be considered "neutral" with respect to one another. The truth of this is
fairly obvious, and the same mathematics which can be applied to
completely neutral mutations--those where there is no impact on the
appearance of the organism at all--can be applied to these "pseudo-neutral"
alleles. Johnson claims that this argument is "merely another attempt to
rescue the natural selection hypothesis from potential falsification by
redefining it as a tautology." There is nothing at all tautological or
illogical about the assertion that two alleles with slightly different
functions, in Kimura's words, "may be equally effective in promoting the
survival and reproduction of the individual." (In fact, it is hard to
imagine a universe in which such things did not occasionally occur.) Johnson claims that "If
fitness is determined only by the brute fact of survival and reproductive
fitness, then there is no effective difference between neutral and
selective evolution." He is wrong. The way in which gene frequencies
change in populations over time--and that is, of course, what the entire
field of population genetics is all about--depends very much on whether one
allele tends to get reproduced more often than others. Here, Johnson does
not seem to understand the difference between the basic forces of drift
and selection.
c. The missing links which aren't, and other
examples
A striking example of Johnson's failure to do
thorough research is found on page 75 of Darwin on
Trial and the following pages. Johnson mentions, in his review of the
vertebrate sequence in the fossil record, four groups of fossils (not
including hominids): rhiphistidian fish, Seymouria, the therapsid mammals, and Archaeopteryx. On p.79, he states: "The mammal
class includes such diverse groups as whales, porpoises, seals, polar
bears, bats, cattle, monkeys, cats, pigs, and opossums. If mammals are a
monophyletic group, then the Darwinian model requires that every one of
the groups have descended from a single unidentified small land mammal.
Huge numbers of species in the direct line of transition would have to
exist, but the fossil record fails to record them." Similarly, on pp.
53-54, he states that no primitive bats or whales occur in the fossil
record. I spent less than an hour checking these claims before finding one
source[15] which lists over three hundred and fifty fossil species or groups
of species which are considered to be transitionals within the mammals.
Furthermore, the author of this source was careful to note that this list
was nowhere near complete. Primitive primate-like fossils are known and
species-to-species transitions are known within the primates; an early
fossil bat is known, with appropriately primitive characters; transitional
fossils for bears are extremely clear; transitionals for seals and cats
are known; there is a whole chain of fossil genera leading up to whales;
there is a transitional sequence for cattle as well as for pigs (not to
mention very good transitional records for
voles, mice, elephants, and ruminants). All of these are organisms which
Darwin on Trial claims the fossil record
"fails to record." Of course, if Johnson believes that these specimens do
not represent true transitionals for some reason, he is welcome to explain
to the rest of us why. Such a contention would be perfectly scientific and
respectable if documented and backed up with careful study. No such
documentation or study exist in Darwin on
Trial.
The errors or misrepresentations go on. Johnson
apparently does not realize that neutral traits cannot be expected to
change under artificial selection (p.18), fails to mention a large body of
work on female mate preference (p.30), attacks ideas which evolutionary
biologists abandoned decades ago (p.79), and does not seem to grasp the
distinction between natural selection and adaptation (p.144) or between
common descent and natural selection (pp.151-152). There are a large
number of other errors, any of which he could have avoided by consulting
with a competent biologist before publishing his book. Several of these
errors have been pointed out by reviewers of the first edition of Darwin on Trial; they remain uncorrected in the
current edition. Johnson has apparently read almost no history or history
of science on the subject of Darwin and Darwinism. The philosophy of
science he uses is perhaps thirty years out of date and at least one
reviewer has pointed out that he employs it incorrectly.[16]
He has not bothered to read more than half-a-dozen articles from the
primary literature (by contrast, a thorough undergraduate thesis might
require a hundred or more). Furthermore, some of the sources he does employ are extremely suspect. Several of
them have not passed through any peer-review process, a process which is
absolutely mandatory before a source is considered to have any scientific
authority. Johnson accepts The Bone Peddlers,
a book by William Fix, as authoritative, despite the fact that the later
chapters, by his own admission, "accept evidence of parapsychological
phenomena uncritically." Another questionable source he relies on is The Neck of the Giraffe, by Francis Hitching. A
little research revealed that Hitching is apparently a believer in Mayan
pyramid energy and other paranormal phenomena, as well as some sort of
professional psychic.[17]
He has no scientific credentials of any kind. Johnson accepts Hitching as
an authority nonetheless.
In short, Johnson is claiming to understand the
entire field of evolutionary theory--a vast field which draws evidence from
dozens of different subfields--on the weight of research which would not be
acceptable for an undergraduate term paper. He ignores basic academic
standards and principles, and has ignored almost all subsequent criticism
on questions of fact. Any of these failings would be more than enough to
disqualify Darwin on Trial as a respectable
academic work.
a. Selective use of evidence
In his book Defeating
Darwinism, Johnson lists a number of 'tricks' which he says
evolutionists use to fool laypeople into believing their arguments. The
strategy Johnson is using here is one which is regularly seen in political
races: candidates often try to "steal the thunder" from their opponents by
pre-emptively accusing them of their own worst
faults. Johnson himself uses the exact strategies he denounces, over and
over again, in Darwin on Trial. For example,
one such 'trick' listed by Johnson is "Selective Use of Evidence." Many of
the examples I have noted above (for instance, the use of excerpts from
Patterson's 1981 speech, or Johnson's omission of most of the fossil
evidence) are just such selective quotation. There are many more such
instances in Darwin on Trial. On p.25, Johnson
invokes a phenomenon called "selection plateaus", which, if taken by
themselves, suggest that there is a permanent boundary to the amount of
change which can be achieved by natural selection. However, Johnson fails
to mention that such plateaus are to be expected under any evolutionary
scenario (Darwinian or otherwise), omits the fact that selection can
continue to change populations after hitting a plateau (the rate of change
simply slows), and does not mention that some large-scale selection
experiments never hit a plateau at all. On p.100, Johnson quotes a review
of molecular evolutionary theory by Allan Wilson,[18]
but his quotation is extremely selective: he quotes what is perhaps the
only sentence in the entire review which is at all skeptical about
molecular clocks, leaving a very skewed impression of Wilson's
article.
The most striking example of the selective use of
evidence, though, appears on p.25. Johnson claims that the idea that
evolutionary theory is a tested scientific hypothesis is one "which
deserves our most respectful scrutiny", and states that we must face a
critical question: "what evidence confirms that this hypothesis is true?"
Johnson then proceeds to list six examples from Futuyma's Science on Trial, and concludes that these
examples are simply inadequate as a foundation for the sweeping claims of
evolutionary theory.
These six examples, examples of natural selection
at work today, are of course totally inadequate to establish evolutionary
theory as a science. But, of course, no evolutionary biologist has ever
claimed that one slender line of evidence is enough. Johnson's sources
certainly don't claim this; on p.36 of Science on
Trial, Futuyma notes that Darwin's theory originally drew its support
from fields as diverse as "comparative anatomy, embryology, behavior,
geographic variation, the geographic distribution of species, the study of
rudimentary organs, atavistic variations ('throwbacks'), and the
geological record to show how all of biology provides testimony that
species have descended with modification from common ancestors." Futuyma
specifically points out that the importance of the theory of evolution
rests on its ability to tie many distinct
threads of evidence together into a single explanation (pp.66-67 of Science on Trial). Futuyma's book makes clear
that a great many types of evidence can be brought to bear on evolutionary
theory: taxonomic (in the form of homologies, embryology, and vestigial
structures or functions), fossil evidence, or biogeographical, for
example. In fact, the biogeographical evidence (i.e., where species occur
on the globe relative to one another) was the single line of evidence
which most convinced Darwin that species had evolved, but biogeography is
not addressed at all in Johnson's book.
Another extremely important line of evidence which Johnson avoids
discussing is the fact that natural selection can only generate structures
or functions which serve to promote the survival and reproduction of the
individual organism. Any complex structure which does not serve such a
functionuctures which exist only for the good of other species, for
example, or which exist only for the sake of beauty-could not possibly
have been formed by natural selection. The fact that no such complex
structures or functions have ever been found (as Futuyma notes, for
example, "No one has ever found a case of a species altruistically serving
another, without any gain for itself") suggests powerfully that natural
selection is responsible for the complex structures and functions we see
in the biological world.
From Darwin on Trial,
it is clear that Johnson knows that these other lines of evidence are
important and relevant. After all, he spends most of the rest of the book
discussing homologies, fossils, and various other, inferential evidence.
But his "respectful" review of the facts somehow manages to leave all of
this out. Comically, the rest of the book depends on Johnson's contention
that the theory of evolution is not supported by the scientific
facts-facts which he deliberately avoids discussing. Never were such grand
pretensions built on so shaky a foundation.
b. The moving target
This is a classic "bait-and-switch" strategy: Darwin on Trial leads the reader to expect a
careful, thorough examination of the evidence, and at the last minute
substitutes a minor subset of the evidence which no-one considers
sufficient to 'prove' evolutionary theory. Johnson uses similar strategies
to distract the reader from important points several times in Darwin on Trial. For example, on p.30, Johnson
acknowledges that Darwin suggested a standard by which his theory of
evolution could be falsified-but he then shifts the topic to whether or
not Darwin suggested other mechanisms of evolution, avoiding the main
point (that complex structures which serve other species could not have
been generated through natural selection). On p.70, he quotes Steven Jay
Gould's claim that imperfections in organisms are strong evidence for
evolution, but then shifts the topic again, stating that Gould is making
theological speculations. This ignores Gould's point, which is that the
pattern of imperfections seen in biological organisms is very consistent
with the theory of evolution. In his chapter on molecular evolution,
Johnson protests that evolutionists went to the molecular evidence looking
for confirmation of their theory rather than without preconceptions. Even
if this were true-and he presents no evidence to support his allegation-it
dodges the most important question, which is: did the molecular evidence
turn out to be consistent with evolutionary theory? And unless the
evolutionists' preconceptions somehow altered the molecular structure of
every species on the planet, why are these supposed preconceptions
relevant anyway? A similar trick is employed on p.99 when Johnson claims
that "the molecular clock hypothesis assumes
the validity of the common ancestry thesis which it is supposed to
confirm." This is misleading. The molecular clock does not merely assume
common ancestry; it goes on to test that thesis. Johnson is apparently
trying to distract the reader from the facts: namely, that the theory of
common ancestry passed the test with flying colors.
Another criticism of evolutionists in Defeating Darwinism is that they use vague and
untestable terms and arguments. Vague and untestable statements are
Johnson's bread and butter, when he's not simply insinuating things. For
example, throughout Darwin on Trial, Johnson
insists that there is a fundamental difference between minor variations or
"microevolution" and larger, creative changes, or "macroevolution" (pp.66,
68-70, 81, 91, 111, 117, 151, 153, for example). However, he carefully
avoids discussing where the boundary between micro- and macroevolution
lies, or how one could tell objectively whether a change is "creative" or
not. The failure to make these definitions renders his arguments
untestable and, by his own standards, valueless. Another good example is
on p.98, where Johnson claims that natural selection "permits variation
only within boundaries". What empirical evidence do we have for these
boundaries? Where exactly are they?
No matter what changes breeders manage to make
through artificial selection, it can always be claimed that these are only
"minor" or "uncreative" changes. There is no way to test Johnson's
arguments scientifically, because the goalposts can simply be moved every
time a challenge is met. What's the simplest explanation for this? Does
Johnson want mobile goalposts? It's possible;
mobile goalposts are tactically very useful. If you read carefully through
Darwin on Trial, you will notice a remarkable
number of places where Johnson suggests or insinuates something rather
than stating it outright, or where he leaves a logical argument vague
rather than well-defined. Usually, this is a good indication that he is
trying to lead the reader to a false conclusion without actually saying a lie outright. This strategy is a
variation on the theme of "plausible deniability"; by suggesting
falsehoods rather than stating them clearly, Johnson can always protest
later that he wasn't really lying, or that his
critics have simply misunderstood his point. His critics aren't
infallible, of course-myself very much included-but it is a curious
coincidence that the point Johnson seems to be
making so often turns out to be false. Johnson is not stupid, and I have
no doubt that he could state his ideas clearly, if that were his goal.
In summary, Darwin on
Trial contains an enormous number of questionable tactics which can
only be described as 'trickery'. In reading carefully through Darwin on Trial, I found that Johnson used the
very 'tricks' he denounces in Defeating
Darwinism a total of fifty-eight times in the
first two chapters alone.[19] I
should emphasize that I was being strict in my reading, but if I am right
about even a tenth of these violations, then
Johnson's work is certainly no model of trustworthiness.
If the facts I've listed above were not enough,
there is--last but not least--my personal correspondence with Johnson. When
I first started to do the research which led to this review, I contacted
Johnson to ask him if there were any sources not cited in his research
notes which were important in supporting the views expressed in Darwin on Trial. Although, as noted above,
Johnson makes many assertions about scientific fact which are not backed
up by any references in his research notes, I felt it irresponsible to
draw hard conclusions without making sure that the research notes told the
whole story.
Johnson first flatly refused to help. I explained
myself more fully, saying that I was simply trying to verify some of his
factual assertions. To this, he responded that the controversy was not
about scientific facts but philosophy. When I pointed out that factual
assertions are very much a matter of scientific facts, he changed tactics,
claiming that he did not have time to answer "open-ended" questions.
To be agreeable, I accepted this at face value and
posed a simpler question instead, asking Johnson if he would provide me
with a transcript of an interview he had with Colin Patterson in London.
(At the time I was puzzled by Johnson's representation of Patterson;
Johnson had provided me with a transcript of the ANMH speech, and I knew
that Patterson hadn't been talking about the theory of evolution in that
speech, but I still hoped that perhaps Johnson hadn't utterly
misrepresented Patterson's views.) Johnson told me to publish my views and
that he would then respond to them. I explained that it would be
inappropriate to publish anything on the subject without trying to do
thorough research first--which naturally involved trying to figure out what
Patterson said during that interview! Johnson's response was that he stood
by what he had written in Darwin on Trial. I
explained that I accepted this fully, but that this did not answer my
question. In this last letter, I asked him to please either provide the
information I had requested or explain why he chose not to do so.
At this point I had received five letters from
Johnson, each with a different excuse for why he was not answering my
questions. I eventually had to send the last letter a second time, because
Johnson simply failed to answer it. When pressed, he finally admitted that
he had no intention of providing me with any information. He would not say
why.
This bizarre correspondence is perhaps especially
notable in light of the dedication to Darwin on
Trial. Johnson piously dedicates his book to "those brave souls who
asked the hard questions even when there was never a chance of getting a
straight answer; and to those in science who want to allow the questions
to be asked." My correspondence with Johnson is an excellent example of
not being able to get a straight answer--and the questions I was asking
were not even hard ones. When it comes to the critical examination of his
own ideas, there seem to be a great many
questions which Phillip Johnson has no intention of permitting. Since
Johnson's dedication suggests that biologists are the evasive ones, I
should add one further point: in the past several years, I have
corresponded with, and asked favors from, evolutionary biologists on many
occasions. None of them have ever answered
those requests with the evasiveness which I received from Phillip
Johnson.
The facts I have listed above all point to one
conclusion, and they are only the tip of the iceberg--there are many, many instances of trickery and misleading
arguments which I haven't discussed in this document. Johnson's repeated
attempts to stereotype evolutionists as atheists despite the fact that he
has every reason to know otherwise; the way in which he has quoted
evolutionary biologists out of context to give impressions which are not
true to their views; the omission of vast amounts of evidence; the
numerous examples of rhetorical sleight-of-hand and inflammatory rhetoric;
his refusal to correct his work even when errors have been pointed out to
him by reviewers; his refusal to follow the norms of intellectual
inquiry--all of these patterns suggest that his intention is not to present an honest, accurate picture to his
audience. They suggest, instead, that he is a lawyer playing the lawyer's
game. I am not the first person to reach this conclusion about Johnson.
For example, philosopher of science Michael Ruse (who initially found that
he agreed with Johnson on certain philosophical issues) found himself
regretting his trust in Johnson after Johnson misused statements made by
Ruse at an American Association for the Advancement of Science symposium
in 1993. Ruse wrote that Johnson's abuses broke him "from my complacent
dream that perhaps we had moved on from the early crude days, where
science was so clearly being attacked by people who had no genuine
interest in finding the truth." Ruse added bluntly: "Johnson's response
showed that his concern was not at all in scholarly debate. He merely
wanted to take shots, simply to win at any cost." (Ruse's comments are
used by Johnson--abused, Ruse might say--in the Epilogue to the second edition of Darwin on Trial.)
It is useless to try to explain science to someone
who isn't interested in what the facts have to say. And it's useless to
try to learn anything from such people. If they are clever, as Johnson is,
they can find a way to claim that almost any fact supports their position.
If evolutionists agree on something, it's a dogmatic orthodoxy; if they
disagree, they're squabbling about every detail of evolutionary theory. If
a piece of evidence seems to count against evolution, evolution has been
disproven; if it seems to count for evolution,
that merely shows that evolution is unfalsifiable. If scientists state
that they are personally atheistic, they are clearly exposing the rotten
metaphysical heart of evolution; if they state that they are religious,
they are clearly trying to cover the rotten heart up. If we learn anything
new, it's evidence that our current theory is completely false; if what we
learn is exactly what we expected, it's only because we were precommitted
to finding it in the first place. If we point out where creationists are
wrong, we are persecuting the underdog; if we ignore them, we are refusing
to face the fact that they're right. If a piece of evidence supports one
part of evolutionary theory, it doesn't support that other part. If we
find a strong piece of evidence for evolution, there ought to be more just
like it. If an evolutionist speaks out in favor of Darwinism, it's because
they were strong-armed into it; if they say anything which can be taken out of context to
suggest any skepticism about evolution, it's
resounding proof that nobody in science believes the theory.
I gave Johnson every chance I could to show that
he was trustworthy. The academic community has done the same. The vast
number of falsehoods and distortions; the trickery and stereotypes; the
misleading way in which Johnson represents scientists and their views as
well as science itself--the sheer number of these instances suggests that
Johnson has little or no interest in truth or science. His focus is, as
Futuyma puts it, "rhetoric, the tool of the Sophists, who taught their
pupils how to win arguments, rather than how to seek for truth."
I would liken Darwin on
Trial to a different ancient and infamous group. Jesus denounced the
Pharisees for their hypocrisy: they observed formal rituals on the
outside, but in their hearts they were corrupt. A "whitewashed tomb" is an
excellent description of Johnson's arguments and the "intelligent design"
movement which is founded on them. They are painstaking about appearing scientific, lavishing effort on their
public relations and trying to dazzle their audience with large,
intellectual-sounding words. But inside, both morally and intellectually,
the movement founded by Phillip Johnson and Darwin
on Trial is dead. And it is the exact
opposite of education. Those who support it should ask themselves what
sort of science can be built on such a thorough disregard for accuracy.
Whether or not biological life as we see it today took shape through
evolutionary processes, the "intelligent design" movement founded on Darwin on Trial is doomed to failure, because it
abandoned at the outset the respect for truth which is fundamental to any
science.
Johnson is a very good lawyer. But science doesn't
need lawyers; instead, it needs witnesses willing to tell "the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth." In my opinion, a comparison
between Johnson's words and his sources show that his approach is
ethically bankrupt. What is even more disturbing is the fact that Darwin on Trial, even according to many
proponents of "intelligent design", is perhaps the best that the movement
has to offer. As one "intelligent design" creationist put it publicly:
"Philip Johnson is the Godfather of all this [intelligent design]. He made
the point first and best." These are the people who are trying to dictate
what our children learn in the public schools-and this book, with all of
its inaccurate and deceptive statements, is one of the books which they
would like to see in the classroom.
Johnson fits perfectly a quote applied to the last
generation of creationists: "Scientific creationism is an intolerable
assault on education not merely because it is the antithesis of reason,
but because it is opposed to the very foundation of true education:
intellectual honesty. Surely education should teach the courage to weigh
evidence and draw conclusions dispassionately, and to recognize their
consequences, however hard or distasteful. Scientific creationism teaches,
instead, the standards of the Madison Avenue marketplace: how to further
your aims by guile, seductive catch phrases, selective quotation of
evidence. ...[S]cientific creationism teaches by its tactics more than by
its words: truth is not the object of brave and honest search. Truth is
whatever you can convince people it is. But to accede to these standards
in education is to teach dishonesty and cowardice."[20]
"Intelligent design" creationists complain that
our society's morals are being eroded because schoolchildren are being
taught to think like scientists. God help our society's values if we teach
our kids to think like Phillip Johnson.
The following are other examples of tricks and
errors in Darwin on Trial. This is not,
unfortunately, an exhaustive list. Readers interested in other reviews of
Darwin on Trial and other of Johnson's books
can find additional material at A Militant Dilettante in Judgment of Science.
a. Bait-and-switch
Bait-and-switch is a common tactic. You have
probably received many envelopes in the mail suggesting that YOU HAVE
DEFINITELY WON some enormous sum of money. Of course, when you open the
envelope, you find that a much less exciting promise has been substituted
for the original: you have definitely won, for example, if you have the winning prize number. It is an
old and tiresome trick.
Such tricks can be found often in Darwin on Trial. For example, at the beginning of
Darwin on Trial, Johnson gives a comfortably
broad definition of a "creationist." Anyone who believes in a creator, he
suggests, is a creationist. This big tent covers people like me, Ken
Miller, and (as I noted above) at least 40% of all American scientists. By
the end of Darwin on Trial, however, Johnson
has substituted in the more conventional definition of "creationist",
meaning somebody who rejects the theory of evolution, presumably in favor
of some sort of ex nihilo creation. The tent
is suddenly a lot smaller. The generous starting definition is the bait.
Don't take bait. There's usually a hook in it. (As I discuss below, the
entire book is something of a bait-and-switch.)
b. Selective use of evidence
On page 5 of Darwin on
Trial, Johnson recounts the story of Nebraska Man, a fiasco in which a
fossilized tooth was found in Nebraska. Wanting to get a jab in at
Williams Jennings Bryan, who was at that moment preparing to argue the
antievolutionist side in the famous Scopes Trial, Henry Osborn declared
that this tooth was from a hominid, possibly an ancestor of the human
race, and dubbed the hypothetical hominid "Nebraska Man" in honor of
Bryan's home state. The tooth was later determined to be from a peccary
rather than from a hominid. (I suspect I am not alone in finding a
delicious irony in Osborn's comeuppance.) Johnson cites this example in an
apparent effort to illustrate how biased evolutionists can be, and how
untrustworthy their judgments are. Johnson leaves out a rather important
point, however. It was Osborn and his collaborators who discovered their
mistake after checking their hypothesis with further research. This story
turns out to be a good example of the "self-correcting" nature of science
in action.
When evidence doesn't work in Johnson's favor, his
policy is to ignore it. For example, on pp.70-71 he cites Steven Jay Gould
and Douglas Futuyma, both making the "argument from imperfection" which is
often used to suggest that an intelligent designer--most often God--couldn't
have been responsible for the rather unintelligent way in which many
organisms are put together. Johnson accuses them of engaging in philosophy
rather than science, saying that the "task of science is not to speculate
about why God might have done things this way, but to see if a material
cause can be established by empirical investigation." But their point is
not theological speculation. Their point is that the features which a
theory of "intelligent design" can't explain-the gills on larval
salamanders, the preponderance of marsupials in Australia, and so on-make
perfect sense if we consider the possibility that these organisms evolved to be what they are today. The examples
given by Gould and Futuyma are striking confirmations of evolution's
explanatory power in the empirical world. True to character, Johnson
spends the rest of the paragraph complaining that evolutionists don't do
enough empirical work.
c. Ad hominems and innuendo
One clever, but unscrupulous, way to win over an
audience (even if logic isn't on your side) is to try to plant negative
feelings about your opponent in their heads. Johnson carefully builds up a
myth in which he and other "intelligent design" creationists are the noble
rebels battling the monolithic, rigid, power structure of Darwinism. He
tries to smear the theory of evolution by referring to it as
"orthodoxy"(p.3). He insinuates that evolutionists are dishonest, accusing
them of using a "tactically advantageous flexibility"(p.16). He claims
that, in response to an article questioning evolution, Steven Jay Gould
wrote an "evasive" article that "put this outsider firmly in his
place"(p.11). The reader would be wise to subtract such emotionally
charged rhetoric from Johnson's sentences and see what substance
remains.
Johnson implies, on p.11, that evolutionists are
making their claims deliberately vague to avoid having them criticized. To
support this claim, he cites a quote by Steven Jay Gould, who stated that
the difficulty of untangling what neo-Darwinian theory predicts "imposes a
great frustration upon anyone who would characterize the modern synthesis
in order to criticize it." However, what Gould is saying is that the
modern synthesis makes a set of general statements but that these
statements are "subject to recognized exceptions"--in other words, that the
modern synthesis is complicated. Gould does
suggest that the way in which these exceptions were wielded made it
unfairly difficult to criticize neo-Darwinism, but Johnson blows a minor
complaint into a charge of conspiracy. The best proof of this is the fact
that Gould himself is wholly convinced that the theory of evolution is
perfectly robust, and that it does not rest on equivocation.
There is some irony in this insinuation of
Johnson's. Since Gould's quote, the scientific community has been
relentlessly pushing forward toward a clearer description of neo-Darwinian
theory. Ever since the "intelligent design" movement started, by contrast,
one of the main planks in its platform has been to keep the identity and
nature of the "designer" deliberately murky. In fact, the main strategy of
Johnson and his colleagues is to focus on "problems with evolution" and
say as little about their own position as possible, in order to avoid
having that position criticized. Intelligent design is rife with ambiguous
definitions and equivocations.
Johnson tries a similar trick on p.90, claiming
that evolutionists have been "vague" about the mechanisms other than
natural selection which can be invoked in evolutionary biology. Darwinists
have not been "vague" about what other means of evolution exist, or how
important they are; they have disagreed on the
subject, and in many cases they will freely admit that they don't know how
common a particular mechanism is, but they haven't been vague. Johnson's
insinuation of deception is utterly unfounded. The same goes for his
insinuation on p.98 that the controversy between neutralists and
selectionists was invented to save Darwinism from being disconfirmed, and
the insinuation on p.99 that the "molecular clock" was dreamed up to
intimidate non-specialists. If Johnson really thinks that scientists do
nothing but sit in their labs and plot how to fool the public, why does he
think they publish so many professional papers grappling with real
biological facts--like neutral alleles, alleles under selection, and the
fact that the molecular clock actually exists? Apparently, in Johnson's
eyes, any time biologists try to explain something which hasn't been
explained before, it is just a cover-up. What would he suggest that
science do, other than try to explain unexplained phenomena?
(Incidentally, in a footnote on p.100, Johnson
cites an article from Roger Lewin in an attempt to call the whole idea of
a molecular clock into question. Other parts of that article deserve
mention. For example, Lewin notes on testing the relationship between apes
and humans: "This has involved many different methods of listening to the
clock ticking, including protein electrophoresis, amino acid sequencing,
restriction mapping of mitochondrial DNA, and sequencing of mitochondrial
and genomic DNA. Virtually all answers fall between the 5 to 10 million
year period, with 7 to 8 million usually given as a good average." Lewin
then cites another biologist:" 'If you need better evidence that there's a
molecular clock working in there somewhere, I don't know what it is.'"
Johnson tries to suggest that the controversy is over whether or not
clocks work at all, whereas the upshot of Lewin's article is that, yes,
they definitely work if you are careful to use them locally and not assume
that they are globally dependable. The puzzle is over exactly what makes them work. [What Johnson is implying
here is a little like saying that you can't depend on a quartz-oscillating
clock unless you personally know exactly how it functions.] Johnson also
leaves out any mention of the figure at the top of p.168 in Wilson's
article, which shows just how closely the molecular-clock hypothesis
matches the divergence times inferred from the fossil record for mammal
lineages. In fact, the only sentence Johnson quotes from Wilson's review
is possibly the only sentence in Wilson's entire article which evinces any
amount of skepticism about molecular clocks!)
On p. 79, Johnson notes that George Gaylord
Simpson pointed out that the mammals could be considered a monophyletic
group if their (possibly numerous) therapsid ancestors shared a single
common ancestor. Johnson insinuates that Simpson is pulling some sort of
trick to do away with the "disturbing" possibility that mammals were
derived from multiple therapsids. This is a deceptive insinuation. First,
Johnson gives no reason why such a possibility would undermine Darwinism.
There's a good reason for this: it wouldn't undermine Darwinism. Second,
since any group sharing a single common ancestor is by definition a
monophyletic group, it is hard to see what trick Simpson is supposed to be
pulling--unless Johnson thinks there is something shady about applying a
definition correctly.
Johnson spends several pages (82-85) doing little
else but insinuating that anthropologists, because of their alleged
precommitments to naturalism and human evolution, cannot be objective. He
is particularly nasty in this section. It is interesting to note how he
attacks the trustworthiness only of those who happen to disagree with him.
On the same note, the claim that Johnson consistently implies throughout
Darwin on Trial--that scientists, who are very
familiar with the facts and come from a broad variety of ideological
backgrounds, are somehow less trustworthy than a lawyer who has little
exposure to the facts and comes to the topic with the declared goal of
putting his brand of religion at the center of everything in our society [21]--is an excellent example of the
sort of doublethink Johnson encourages.
In his chapter on "Darwinian Education", Johnson
cites two publications in particular which he claims support his
contention that Darwinists are out to brainwash society through the
educational system. One is the California State Board of Education's Policy Statement on the Teaching of Science from
1989; the other is California's Science
Framework, a curriculum guide. Johnson spends several pages claiming
that Darwinists are trying to suppress those who would ask questions about
evolution, that these documents endorse naturalism as a metaphysics and
attempt to compel students not only to understand evolutionary concepts
but agree with them, and so on. I read these documents. There is nothing
in either to support Johnson's accusations, and both documents are very
careful to avoid compelling anyone to believe in anything.
d. Misrepresentations of science
On page 12, Johnson claims that the "fact of
evolution is vacuous unless it comes with a supporting theory", a claim
recently repeated in other words by Johnson's colleague William Dembski in
the book No Free Lunch. I would disagree;
knowing that an organism can change over time into something entirely
different, or that all organisms are derived from a common ancestor, would
be extremely interesting even if we weren't sure exactly how it happened.
And we know a lot more about the origins of modern organisms than Johnson
claims. (Alert readers will have noticed the hypocrisy in Johnson's claim
as well: "intelligent design", of course, comes with no supporting
mechanism whatsoever.)
Pages 29-30 discuss various "subsidiary concepts",
including kinship selection, pleiotropy, and sexual selection, which
Johnson claims are "capable of furnishing a plausible explanation for just
about any conceivable eventuality." Johnson insinuates that these concepts
were invented merely to explain any difficult facts, but this is false;
these concepts were developed because things like kinship selection,
pleiotropy, and sexual selection have been proven to exist. Johnson claims
that these mechanisms "are so flexible that in combination they make it
difficult to conceive of a way to test the claims of Darwinism
empirically", a claim which should come as a surprise to the many
biologists who have tested these ideas
empirically. There are indeed many mechanisms which might produce
seemingly counterintuitive results, but all of them can be-and routinely
are-tested. If these subsidiary concepts were being employed as Johnson
suggests, we ought to be able to point to case after case where all of
them failed to explain a puzzling observation. We can't. Ironically, the
one alternative Johnson suggests to explain an anomaly--the peacock's
tail--is truly an explanation which covers any conceivable event: a
"whimsical Creator" (p.31).
A similar example might be Johnson's statement on
p.43 that "The prevailing assumption in evolutionary science seems to be
that speculative possibilities, without experimental confirmation, are all
that is really necessary." Again, this will come as news to the
evolutionary biologists who spend huge amounts of time and effort testing
these ideas. And, again, "speculative possibilities, without experimental
confirmation" are all that fifteen years of "intelligent design"
creationism has ever offered.
On p.91, Johnson claims that
"'Panselectionism'--the doctrine that natural selection preserves or
eliminates even minute variations--is a logical consequence of the
assumption that natural selection can build complex biological structures
with only micromutations for raw material." This is false. It is by now
well known (in fact, it can be determined mathematically) that mutations
of very small effect can be practically "invisible" to selection,
especially in small populations, and some genetic material has no apparent
effect on the phenotype of an organism and therefore isn't subject to
selection at all. Furthermore, panselectionism rules out a number of other
processes which are not proscribed by an inference to macroevolution from
microevolution. Johnson seems to be suggesting here that no genes can be
really neutral; if so, he is contradicted by a mass of studies on the
subject.
Johnson's argument on pp.95-96 that "molecular
equidistance" is at odds with the theory of evolution appears to have been
taken from the work of another antievolutionist, Michael Denton. It is
possible that Johnson employs it in good faith, thinking that Denton is a
reliable source. Therefore I will only note here that Johnson should have
run this argument past a practicing biologist, who could have told him
immediately why it is mistaken. Johnson, like Denton, thinks that
equidistance is an "astonishing" coincidence, and marvels: "How could such
a coincidence happen? It could happen if the rate of molecular change was
independent of what was going on in the phenotypes, and unaffected by
natural selection." Well, that's precisely what biologists think is going on, so equidistance is not all that
surprising. Why would the molecules care if
they were inside a muskrat rather than a pigeon? The phenomenon of
equidistance is actually remarkably strong support for the theory of
common ancestry. If organisms did not share a
common ancestor, equidistance really would be
inexplicable. More information on molecular equidistance can be found at
Sequences and Common Descent.
Johnson, like many antievolutionists, for some
reason tries hard to convince his readers that prebiotic evolution is part
of evolutionary biology (Chapter 8). It isn't. The rules which governed
the prebiotic world are very different than the rules which govern the
dynamics of populations of living organisms. Most of the tools applied to
biological evolution, and the concepts which have been found to operate in
populations of living beings, simply cannot be applied to the question of
abiogenesis. Darwin himself specifically excluded prebiological evolution
from his theory, but of course Johnson doesn't want his readers to know
this. Apparently Johnson insists that biological and prebiological
evolution are the same because to do otherwise would undermine his
thesis-that evolution is not about science but about expelling God from
the universe, start to finish. It does undermine that thesis, of course,
but (of course) that thesis is also merely deceit on Johnson's part. Given
the fact that this chapter has nothing to do with biological evolution, I
have not reviewed the tricks used in Chapter 8. Life is too short.
e. Quote mining
"Quote mining" is the practice of hunting for
quotes which appear superficially to support your position, even if the
rest of the source you're quoting from clearly states otherwise. Quotes
out of context are often used in this way to argue that evolutionists
don't think the theory of evolution is accurate. (Any time you see such a
quote, have a look at the original source rather than taking it at face
value. If evolutionists didn't believe in the accuracy of evolutionary
theory, they wouldn't be evolutionists.) I've mentioned several examples
of this above, but there are more. On p.18, Johnson cites Pierre Grassé,
saying that Grassé "concluded that the results of artificial selection
provide powerful testimony against Darwin's theory." This is misleading.
Grassé believed that all species descended from a common ancestor, so it
can hardly be said honestly that he agreed with Johnson's claim that
selection can't take organisms beyond the limits of species (or even
phyla). He did not invoke any supernatural explanations, so he cannot even
be considered a creationist in the conventional sense. What Grassé did
believe was that species somehow "ran out of" the ability to evolve as
they became more specialized. His true opinions on the theory of evolution
are given in the first few pages of the book cited by Johnson: "Zoologists
and botanists are nearly unanimous in considering evolution as a fact and
not a hypothesis. I agree with this position and base it primarily on
documents provided by paleontology, i.e., the history of the living
world."[22]
More quote mining is found on pp.20-21, where
Johnson cites four luminaries of biology who note that "survival of the
fittest", if taken by itself, is tautological. So far, so good, but none
of the gentlemen cited would agree with the suggestion which Johnson goes
on to make: that evolutionary theory therefore does not explain anything.
In fact, all would disagree quite strongly.
There is another example on p.38, where Johnson
suggests that, in 1967, mathematicians calculated that the probability of
the gradual evolution of the eye was vanishingly small; according to
Johnson, they were savagely attacked by the biologists present, who
insisted solely on philosophical grounds that the theory of evolution must
be correct. I read the transcript of the meeting he is discussing [23] and found that it tells a
rather different story. First, the mathematician in question, D.S. Ulam,
emphasized repeatedly that his calculations were premature and not to be
taken entirely seriously. Second, there is no indication that the
biologists were insisting on the correctness of evolution because of some
metaphysical commitment. The postulate that evolution (mainly by means of
natural selection) has occurred can be inferred from the nature of living
organisms today, not from mere faith in a theory. Given the uncertainty of
the calculations and the weight of the evidence in favor of evolution, the
most reasonable response for any researcher would be to suspect that there
were problems with the math.
Johnson goes on to cite a speech by a
mathematician named Schutzenberger, who, he implies, claimed that the
theory of evolution was irrevocably flawed (and, apparently, that special
creation was the best possible alternative). This second implication is
belied by Schutzenberger's own words: "we are not trying to smuggle in
extra-scientific principles. Thus if we claim that radically new
principles are needed we also believe that these have to be found within
physics." Schutzenberger's argument is abstruse, but nothing in it
suggested what Johnson implies, namely that Schutzenberger's mathematical
calculations had shown Darwinian evolution to be impossible.
f. Begging the question
On p.18, Johnson presents the "dogs are just dogs"
argument: yes, artificial selection has produced a remarkable variety of
dog breeds, but they're all still dogs.
Creationists often claim that this shows that selection can't make one
type of animal into another. However, were we to have found animals as
distinct as a Great Dane and a chihuahua in the wild, we would have
certainly put them in different species, perhaps even separate genera;
they are far more distinct than a fox is from a wolf, and those are in
different genera. The problem is that "dog" has an elastic meaning.
Without a fixed meaning, a dog can never--by
definition, even if the theory of evolution is correct in every
detail--change into anything but another dog.
It could be objected here that all dogs can still
interbreed, and that therefore they are all one species. But that misses
the point-that artificial selection has generated an enormous diversity of
forms, sizes, shapes, and behaviors, and that there's no sign (yet) of a
limit to its ability to generate more. Creating two groups of animals
which can't interbreed is not all that difficult--it has been done in
laboratory experiments, and we have excellent evidence of it happening
naturally (and frequently) in the wild. We have lots of examples
suggesting that evolution can produce noninterbreeding species; dogs just
don't happen to be one of them.
g. "Straw man" arguments
When a debater is faced with an argument he can't
vanquish, one clever trick is this: attack a different argument--and hope
that the audience doesn't notice the difference between the original and
the "straw man" you've set up. Johnson spends much of his book attacking
opinions that evolutionists don't hold and predictions that the theory of
evolution doesn't make. For example, he implies that if the theory were
correct, all species should always be going through major evolutionary
alterations (p.19); but the theory of evolution predicts no such thing. He
recites the argument that natural selection is just a tautology (p.20
ff.); but what he's really attacking is a particular mathematical
formulation of the theory which does not include the mechanism behind
selection, and his argument is invalid in nature (where selection always
has mechanisms). As noted above, on p.27 he implies that scientists think
that the direct observational evidence is sufficient to prove Darwinism;
but no scientist believes this.
A related trick is to claim that, if the
opponent's theory is true, we should be able to see or do X, where X is
something the theory does not predict or which is impossible to carry out
for other reasons. Johnson suggests that, because "no one has ever
confirmed by experiment that the gradual evolution of wings and eyes is
possible"(p.36), we should call evolutionary theory into question. How on
earth scientists should be able to experimentally reproduce the gradual
evolution of anything is not a topic he discusses.
Since such experiments are impossible whether
evolutionary theory is correct or not, their absence can hardly count as
disconfirmation of the theory. The same is true for his argument on p.66,
where he seems to suggest that laboratory scientists should be able to
transform a single species into animals as varied as a shark and a monkey
(although, here, what he is demanding is so vague that it is impossible to
be sure). In general, one of Johnson's strategies, when faced with
evidence he can't ignore, is to complain that evolutionists should have
found more evidence. For example, he tries to
dismiss Archaeopteryx, an excellent
intermediate between reptiles and birds, saying: "If we are testing
Darwinism rather than merely looking for a confirming example or two, then
a single good candidate for ancestor status is not enough to save a theory
that posits a worldwide history of continual evolutionary transformation."
(Why Archaeopteryx should exist at all if
evolution didn't happen is a question Johnson finds it convenient to
overlook, not to mention overlooking the vast number of other intermediate
fossils now known.) Another instance where Johnson tries to distract
attention from existing evidence by demanding more is found on pp.86-87,
where Johnson discusses the proto-whale Basilosaurus. The fact that evolutionary theory
predicted an early whale with vestigial legs like Basilosaurus, Johnson suggests, doesn't matter
unless evolutionists can resolve every
question involved in the evolution of whales from terrestrial mammals. The
fact that we don't know every detail about how
it happened is hardly relevant; what the existence of Basilosaurus seems to confirm is that it did happen. The sort of demands Johnson makes
could be used to dismiss any science--because we don't fully understand
quantum mechanics, should we throw away all of chemistry, for example?
A more extreme example of this same strategy is
found on pp.91-92, in Johnson's preface to his section on the molecular
evidence. The molecular evidence is such a striking confirmation of
evolutionary theory that Johnson finds it necessary to distract the
audience with irrelevant demands before he
even presents the evidence. His trick here is to insist that the molecular
evidence tell us all of the details of how
organisms evolved from a common ancestor. Of course, evolutionists have
never claimed that the molecular evidence could be applied to that
question. The theory of common descent makes
many predictions which are beautifully confirmed by the molecular
evidence. Demanding that the molecular evidence also confirm the separate
theory of natural selection is an illogical
move, made only to distract the reader. A similar absurdity is found on
the next page (p.93), where Johnson suggests that genetic similarities
between humans and animals are unimportant because they do "little to
explain the profound dissimilarities between
humans and animals of any kind." Of course they don't; they are, however,
exactly what the theory of common descent predicted. Who has claimed they
explain anything else? These are good examples of a common ploy used by
Johnson: what faced with evidence that confirms one aspect of Darwin's
theory, demonstrate that it doesn't confirm another aspect and declare
victory. It is hard to see how science would have gotten anywhere if it
lent any credence to such silliness.
Similarly, the statement that "sudden appearance
and stasis in the fossil record is the opposite of what Darwinian theory
would predict"(p.56) is false; Darwinian theory does not necessarily
entail a constant rate of change. The same is true for the apparently
arbitrary mass extinctions which have occurred repeatedly in the earth's
history. Johnson claims that the record of extinctions is "disappointing
to Darwinist expectations", but he does not make clear what he thinks
Darwinists should have been expecting in the first place, or why they
should be disappointed. I don't know of any biologists who find the
pattern of extinctions "disappointing"; if Johnson does, he should let us
know.
On p.78, criticizing the scientific account of the
evolution of mammals, Johnson states: "The notion that mammals-in-general
evolved from reptiles-in-general through a broad clump of diverse
therapsid lines is not Darwinism. Darwinian transformation requires a
single line of ancestral descent." This last statement is true, but it
provides no support for Johnson's contention that the existence of many
similar fossils makes the therapsids somehow "ambiguous." The many
therapsids make it difficult for scientists to determine which of the therapsids might have been the
direct ancestor of mammals, but the fact that the therapsids are excellent
intermediate fossils between mammals and reptiles strongly supports the
Darwinian claim that one of the therapsids is
the direct ancestor of mammals. The statement on p.79 is farcical: "most
of the therapsids with mammal-like characteristics were not part of a
macroevolutionary transition. If most were not then perhaps all were not."
This is like claiming that "most of the people in the city clearly didn't murder the poor victim who was found dead
with three bullets in his back--so perhaps none of them did!" Perhaps
Johnson should try this argument out in the courtroom sometime. (This
argument is also suggested in Johnson's "research notes" on p.191, and on
p.81 in reference to Archaeopteryx.)
In this same section of his book, Johnson claims
that many similar fossils which weren't in a direct ancestral line is
evidence against the idea that similarities imply ancestry. Similarities
don't imply ancestry, they imply relatedness. This is a bit like claiming that
your similarity to your uncle means that perhaps you aren't related to
either of your parents. Another "straw man" here is the statement that the
possibly polyphyletic origin of mammals from therapsids undermines the
inference that similarity is due to relatedness. This is not the case; if
those multiple therapsids had a single common ancestor, evolutionary
theory predicts similarity among their mammalian descendents. Polyphyly
would only undermine the inference of common descent if we found that
distantly-related taxa share more traits with one another than they share
with their closer relatives--say, if mammals and birds shared a large
number of traits not possessed by reptiles. Incidentally, Johnson avoids
the most important point about the therapsids: Why should such
intermediates should exist if mammals didn't evolve from reptiles? The
mangled logic and evasive rhetoric in this section are especially good
indicators that Johnson is trying to distract the reader from the
important issues involved.
h. Conspiracy theory
When he can find examples where evolutionists seem
to repudiate the theory of evolution, Johnson quotes them as accurate
pictures of the true state of scientists' beliefs. But when those
scientists later say that their words were taken out of context, or that
their earlier position was simply wrong, Johnson claims or implies that
they only did this because the Darwinian establishment pressured them into
it. Of course, such a strategy can be used to throw out any evidence you
don't like. It has been used to argue, for example, that few people
actually died in the Holocaust and that people only believe so because a
Jewish conspiracy controls the media; that all men really do want to kill
their fathers and marry their mothers, and that they don't say so only
because these feelings are "repressed"; and so forth. In Darwin on Trial, Johnson actually makes the claim
that Sir Karl Popper backed down from his statement that natural selection
was tautological only because Darwinians attacked him for making it. If
Johnson has any evidence for this absurd claim, he should present it.
Otherwise, this can only be interpreted as something Johnson chose to make
up.
Johnson spends much of Chapter Eleven insisting
that Darwinians are out to brainwash everyone; in his words, "from a
Darwinist perspective it is no more possible to understand evolution and
honestly disbelieve it than it is to understand arithmetic and think that
four times two is seven"(p.143), and Johnson suggests that Darwinists will
try to break those who oppose them. The truth is that educators, even
Darwinian ones, aren't interested in compelling belief; if their students
understand a theory, that is enough. Belief is not required. An illustration of this
might be the fact that Kurt Wise, who is not only a creationist but a
creationist of the "young-earth" school, earned his graduate degree at
Harvard--under the tutelage of no less than Steven Jay Gould, who is of
course one of the best-known Darwinians in the world. Wise made no secret
of his beliefs during that time, yet, as historian Ronald Numbers puts it,
"Gould always treated him with respect."[24]
The Darwinist Big Brother who Johnson is trying to invent would never have
allowed such a heresy. Nonetheless, Wise got his degree simply by
demonstrating that he understood Darwin's
theory, though it was well known that he disbelieved it.
Another critical element of any conspiracy theory
is the insistence that the conspirators are keeping everything carefully
under wraps. Johnson insists many times that evolutionists don't talk
about any difficulties with the theory. This is of course false. If
evolutionists didn't publicly discuss their disagreements and the
difficulties they find with the current understanding of evolutionary
theory, creationists like Johnson would never know these difficulties
existed: Johnson, like almost all creationists, does no research of his
own and would have no way of learning about these things if evolutionists
really wanted to keep them secret.
Conspiracy theory is really what Darwin on Trial is all about. Johnson opens his
book with discussions of science and material that sounds agreeable and
reasonable, but this is just the hook to draw the reader in; by the last
few chapters, Johnson's venom is in full spate and he is insisting that
the scientific establishment has nothing better to do than persecute
harmless creationists. What is perhaps most disturbing about this book,
from a Christian perspective, is Johnson's willingness to play on the
baser instincts of his audience. What he is appealing to is the streak of
paranoia which has developed in a Christian community that sees itself as
hemmed in by secular enemies; he encourages these people to hate and
stereotype rather than to seek to understand. Coupled with the almost
total indifference, if not a deliberate disregard, toward accurate
arguments, this makes Darwin on Trial more
likely to poison believers' hearts than to forward God's purposes on
earth. All in all, I find this book far more disturbing from a Christian
point of view than I do from a scientific one. And that is very sad
indeed.
Acknowledgments
I am indebted to Prof. Arthur Shapiro for his
explanations of pattern cladism, and his discussions of various aspects of
creationism. Wise suggestions on this manuscript were made by Mark Perakh,
Brian Poindexter, Morgan Grey, Wesley Elsberry, Lizard6849, pimvanmeurs,
chrysothamnus, michaelshopkins, and probably a few others who I'm
forgetting. The remaining foolish errors are mine.
Comments and criticism are welcome; in particular,
if I've gotten my facts wrong anywhere in this document, I would be
grateful to hear of it.
[1]I have a great deal
of sympathy for those Christians who have placed their trust in Johnson
and the "intelligent design" movement. It is grim to see how the faith
and generosity of spirit of the Christian community can be manipulated.
Sadly, it is true that if one is willing to believe the best about other
people, one will sometimes be betrayed by wolves wearing sheep's
clothing.
[2]This review may be
found in Creation/Evolution, vol.12, no.2,
pp.47-56.
[3]"Poll Finds Americans
Split on Creation Idea." 1982. New York
Times, Aug. 29.
[4]Gilkey, L. Creationism on Trial (Winston Press, Inc.,
Minneapolis).
[5]Futuyma, D. Science on Trial.
[6]There is some debate
over whether or not "methodological naturalism" excludes anything
supernatural, such as God, by definition. I would argue that it does
not. If God or God's action could be detected empirically, then
"methodological naturalism" would be able to pick it up; however, in
such a case many scientists would consider God's influence to be part of
the natural world rather than the
supernatural. In fact, it's hard to say what meaning the words "natural"
and "supernatural" have, except that the first follows rules and can be
detected empirically, while the second doesn't and can't.
[7]Pennock, R.T., 1999.
The Tower of Babel. MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts. p.300.
[8]Johnson's insistence
that the developmental patterns in tetrapods do not support evolutionary
theory seems to result from an insistence on what Ridley's Evolution and classification (1986) calls "the
principle of terminal addition". If evolution can only add new steps
onto the end of the developmental path of an organism, then of course
the earlier stages should be identical for all organisms descended from
a common ancestor. There are good reasons to think that evolution would
add steps to the end of the developmental path more often than to the beginning, but no
justification for thinking that steps are only added at the end. Like most of biology,
comparative embryology is messy, and not every detail will support a
theory even if that theory is 100% correct. As Evolution and classification states: "We do not
know how often, or in what circumstances, the embryological criterion is
valid. Its truth is proportional to that of the principle of terminal
addition: but we do not know how frequent terminal addition is in
nature; and we do know that, at least sometimes, the principle is wrong.
We must, in the end, deliver the same judgment on the embryological
criterion as we gave for outgroup comparison. It is imperfect; it is
better than nothing; further investigation may improve it."
[9]Kimura, M. The
Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution. Scientific American, Nov. 1979,
pp.98-126.
[10]Patterson, C. Evolution.
[11]Creationists of
various kinds have cited Patterson before in support of their views-much
to his dismay. See Patterson Misquoted.
[12]First published in
1980; Paleobiology 6(1),
pp.119-130.
[13]Strangely, Johnson
here seems to suggest that the knowledge of animal breeders is
equivalent to the knowledge involved in "intelligent design". Actually,
you can breed animals without knowing the first thing about how they
work-a far cry from the superhuman intelligence currently required to
build even a small biological system from scratch. Artificial selection,
in terms of intelligence, is a lot closer to natural selection than it
is to the molecule-level engineering suggested by "intelligent design"
creationists. In fact, artificial selection can even occur
unconsciously, so it arguably doesn't require intelligence at
all.
[14]Kimura, M. The
Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution. Scientific American, Nov. 1979,
pp.98-126.
[15]See Transitional Vertebrate Fossils FAQ.
[16]A review in the Journal of Scientific Exploration 6(2), by
Henry Bauer.
[17]More information on
Hitching can be found at Francis Hitching: Commonly quoted by creationists.
[18]Wilson, A. 1985.
"The molecular basis of evolution." Scientific
American, October 1985, pp.164-173.
[19]This is not even a
full accounting of the questionable practices employed by Johnson in
these pages; there are a number of other tricks used in these chapters
which are not listed in Defeating
Darwinism.
[20]Science on Trial, pp.219-220.
[21]Forrest, B. 2001.
"The wedge at work." Pp.1-53 in Pennock, R.T., ed. Intelligent design creationism and its critics.
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[22]Evolution of Living Organisms, p.3
[23]Moorehead, P.S., and
M.M. Kaplan. 1967. Mathematical Challenges to
the Neo-Darwinian Interpretation of Evolution.
[24]Numbers, R.L. 1992.
The creationists. University of California
Press, Berkeley, p.281.
Also posted at TalkDesign.org
Discussion
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