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Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Tremblay, Francois |
Jun 28, 2004
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Thank you for your nice letter.
You have to understand that I am praising Dr. Craig in a relative manner. Insofar as most professional theologians present arguments that are flawed in many similar ways, it is refreshing to see arguments which do not fall into basic fallacies (such as special pleading).
Furthermore, Dr. Craig attempts to discuss divine nature in a meaningful way, even conceding that God must have been atemporal prior to Creation (which, as I mentioned, makes no logical sense, but at least is an attempt to dispel some critical flaws of the doctrine of divine creation).
In that sense, Dr. Craig's work and his presentation of the Kalam argument is sophisticated.
I am puzzled by your argument that propositions cannot be logical or illogical. You seem to be saying that only syllogisms can be logical or illogical, but surely you are aware that propositions, and even concepts can be logical or illogical.
For instance, we properly say that "square-circle" is an illogical concept because it breaks the law of non-contradiction.
It seems to me that the proposition "something can come from nothing" clearly breaks the law of non-contradiction as well, although in a less direct way.
But I welcome the comments and am looking forward to your reply on this matter.
Francois Tremblay
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
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Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Rossow, Amiel |
Jun 28, 2004
|
Mr. Tremblay: Thanks for taking time to respond to my letter. You wrote:
You have to understand that I am praising Dr. Craig in a relative manner. Insofar as most professional theologians resent arguments that are flawed in many similar ways, it is refreshing to see arguments which do not fall into basic fallacies (such as special pleading).
Furthermore, Dr. Craig attempts to discuss divine nature in a meaningful way, even conceding that God must have been atemporal prior to Creation (which, as I mentioned, makes no logical sense, but at least is an attempt
to dispel some critical flaws of the doctrine of divine creation).
In that sense, Dr. Craig's work and his presentation of the Kalam argument is sophisticated.
I do not find this argument convincing. To my mind it is hardly reasonable to call a discourse sophisticated if (as you yourself have shown quite convincingly) it contains blatantly illogical assertions. Of course, Craig is a very well educated writer who possesses a substantial knowledge of many
subjects and some of his articles offer interesting ideas (as, for example, his article in the anthology Mere Creation, edited by Dembski, where Craig discusses some paradoxes of quantum mechanics on the level which indeed, I think, may be referred to as sophisticated). However, when discussing the Kalam argument and its various modifications, which seems to be Craig's pet endeavor, he invariably inserts into his allegedly logical sets of arguments
at least one step that requires a leap of faith, and seems not to notice it.
This is what, to my mind, makes his acclaimed discourse being far from sophisticated.
You also wrote: "I am puzzled by your argument that propositions cannot be logical or
illogical. You seem to be saying that only syllogisms can be logical or illogical, but surely you are aware that propositions, and even concepts can be logical or illogical."
Mr. Tremblay, you put words into my mouth. What I do say is that there is no such meaningful dichotomy between premises which distinguishes the logical from the illogical ones. A premise for any discourse is chosen based on
considerations which are neither logical nor illogical as far as the premises are considered within their own framework. A premise is a starting point of a logical discourse. It can be chosen as a postulate based on an interpretation of observational or experimental data, or it can be chosen as a matter of faith, or as a philosophical principle, but within the framework of the discourse wherein it is a premise, it is neither logical nor illogical. Of course, it may happen that a notion which has been chosen as a premise in a certain discourse, can also serve as a part of another
discourse wherein it is not a premise but a step in a set of logical steps.
[continued]
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
|
Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Rossow, Amiel |
Jun 28, 2004
|
[continued]
In that other discourse it can be either logical or illogical. But if a notion is utilized as a premise, then, regardless of its being logical or not in some other discourse, it cannot be characterized as either logical or
illogical within the framework if the discourse in which it is the premise.
In particular, the statement in question ("nothing can come out of nothing") is being used in the Craig's argument and in your critique of it as a premise, and therefore, within the framework of that discourse it cannot be characterized as either logical or illogical. Indeed, it has not been derived from any underlying notion but is simply postulated ad initio.
Was Euclid's axiom logical or illogical? Neither. It was postulated by Euclid based on his interpretation of observational data. Having postulated it, he then logically derived a chain of notions and every step of deriving
various theorems had to be logical in order to be accepted. The initial axiom was however neither logical nor illogical but simply postulated (although Euclid believed it to be self-evident truth). When Lobachevsky,
Gauss, Riemann, and others built their geometries, they replaced Euclid's axiom with alternatives all of which were neither logical nor illogical but just alternative postulates.
Likewise, the assertion that nothing can come out of nothing is neither logical nor illogical -- it is just a postulate and, contrary to what you seem to say, it does not contradict any underlying notion because there is no such underlying notion from which it was derived. Indeed, as Meeker pointed out in his letter (and you seem to accept it) a point of view according to which something can come out of nothing is indeed a postulate seriously discussed in physics. If a postulate which is opposite to that you consider to be "logical" can in fact turn out to be true, obviously
there cannot be anything illogical in it. Each of the two statements, ("something can come out of nothing" vs "nothing can come out of nothing") which are contrary to each other, can turn out to be true, and the categories of logical and illogical are irrelevant for them.
[continued]
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
|
Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Rossow, Amiel |
Jun 28, 2004
|
[continued]
You also wrote: "For instance, we properly say that 'square-circle' is an illogical concept because it breaks the law of non-contradiction."
This statement belongs in a different category. It is a derivative statement. Prior to stating anything about squared circle, we define what is a square and what is a circle and part of the definitions is the statement (not necessarily explicit) that a square cannot be circular. This is part of the definition and an assertion which is untrue by definition cannot serve as a useful premise. Any premise has to be postulated but a statement which is definitely untrue is a defective premise. Having chosen a defective premise, you still may derive from it a chain of perfectly logical notions, but being logical would not make them true because the premise was untrue by definition. The statement you offer is not illogical, it is untrue. Illogical and untrue are two different concepts. A statement can very well be untrue but not illogical (for example, if it has been derived in a
perfectly logical set of notions from an untrue premise). The history of science abounds in discarded theories which were accepted based on a limited knowledge and were perfectly logical within the framework of the available
knowledge. They were logical in the sense they were compatible with the entirety of known data. Then new facts were discovered which showed that the premise was false and the fact that the theory was logically compatible with
the previous premise did not save it from being discarded. Phlogiston theory was perfectly logical as it jibed very well with all known data. The existence of phlogiston was postulated (i.e. served as a premise for the
theory). When new facts were discovered, which contradicted the phlogiston theory, it was discarded not because it was found illogical within its own framework, but because the premise was found to be false. If the premise
were true, the phlogiston theory would stay and its being logical was not denied by its being found untrue.
You also wrote: "It seems to me that the proposition 'something can come from nothing'
clearly breaks the law of non-contradiction as well, although in a less direct way."
I don't think so. There is nothing illogical in that assertion. It also can be true, as quantum physics allows. Whether it is true or not, has nothing to do with logic. What does it contradict? Nothing. It is not derived from
any other statement which it could contradict.
Best wishes,
Amiel Rossow
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
|
Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Tremblay, Francois |
Jun 30, 2004
|
Well, I've said all I had to say on your idea that premises cannot be logical or illogical. I don't think it makes any good sense whatsoever, since premises can be coherent or incoherent just as any other proposition.
As I pointed out, the proposition "something can come from nothing" breaks the law of non-contradiction. You did reply though, saying that it does not contradict in the context of quantum physics. I don't know what you mean here, but I presume you are talking about the production of particles in a zero-energy space.
But in the proposition "something can come from nothing", "nothing" is a metaphysical state of absence of any potentiality whatsoever, which is obviously not what we have in quantum physics. Therefore such a rebuttal does not address the point. Quantum physics does not say that "something can come from nothing" in a metaphysical sense.
Francois Tremblay
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
|
Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Rossow, Amiel |
Jun 30, 2004
|
Mr Tremblay wrote in his latest reply to my letter:
"Well, I've said all I had to say on your idea that premises cannot be logical or illogical. I don't think it makes any good sense whatsoever,
since premises can be coherent or incoherent just as any other proposition."
I can only repeat that logic itself cannot vouch for a premise. Our conclusion regarding the truth of a premise comes not from logic but either from faith or from empirical evidence. In many situations we simply agree to
accept a premise for the sake of discussion leaving out the question of its being true or false. We say, "IF this premise is true, then
. Etc." The further steps of the discourse must follow the rules of logic. A premise itself is a postulate chosen regardless of considerations of logic.
You wrote further: "As I pointed out, the proposition 'something can come from nothing' breaks the law of non-contradiction. You did reply though, saying that it does not
contradict in the context of quantum physics. I don't know what you mean here, but I presume you are talking about the production of particles in a zero-energy space."
I did not say that there is no contradiction only in the context of quantum physics. It was just an example. I maintain that the statement "something can come out of nothing" contains no contradiction in any sense, regardless of quantum physics. Quantum physics just provides an example. If there is
(or may be) empirical evidence of something coming out of nothing, this simply would say something about the statement in question being true or false but it hardly will add much to the fact that it is not contradictory. Indeed, can you point out to a statement which it contradicts? I don't think so.
[continued]
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
|
Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Rossow, Amiel |
Jun 30, 2004
|
[continued]
You wrote further:
"But in the proposition 'something can come from nothing', 'nothing' is a metaphysical state of absence of any potentiality whatsoever, which is obviously not what we have in quantum physics. Therefore such a rebuttal
does not address the point. Quantum physics does not say that 'something can come from nothing' in a metaphysical sense."
What you do here, you implicitly include into the term "nothing" an inherent lack of capability to produce something thus making the premise in question untrue by definition. On the other hand, it converts the statement 'nothing can come out of nothing' into an empty tautology. However, there is no
requirement to antecedently interpret the term "nothing" as inherently incapable of producing something. If we do not antecedently attribute to "nothing" incapability of producing something, our premise is not inherently contradictory. For example, empirical evidence for something produced from
nothing would negate your interpretation, and since there is no reason to deny the possibility of such empirical evidence, there is no reason to view "nothing" as metaphysical "nothing" void of any potentiality. If you antecedently define "no nothing" as incapable of producing something, you compromise the integrity of your discourse by implicitly including into the premise the putative conclusion of any further logical discourse.
Best wishes,
Amiel Rossow
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
|
Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Tremblay, Francois |
Jul 04, 2004
|
"What you do here, you implicitly include into the term "nothing" an inherent lack of capability to produce something thus making the premise in question untrue by definition."
Unless we are using a different language here, it is not an inclusion but a definition. That is what "nothing" means. A state of nothingness implies the total absence of both potentiality and actuality. Otherwise there is "something".
"On the other hand, it converts the statement 'nothing can come out of nothing' into an empty tautology."
It is certainly not "empty" since its truth-value disproves the opposite proposition, "something can come out of nothing".
"For example, empirical evidence for something produced from nothing would negate your interpretation"
Empirical evidence for the illogical ? I don't think you understand that accepting empirical evidence implies the acceptance of logic. Otherwise the empirical evidence could not be assembled in coherent parts.
"If you antecedently define "no nothing" as incapable of producing something, you compromise the integrity of your discourse by implicitly including into the premise the putative conclusion of any further logical discourse."
Just cut the long words and simply say I am begging the question. Geesh. And no, I am not begging the question, I am simply pointing out that "something can come out of nothing" is illogical, given the meaning of each.
Francois Tremblay
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
|
Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Rossow, Amiel |
Jul 04, 2004
|
Dear Francois:
You wrote: "Unless we are using a different language here, it is not an inclusion but
a definition. That is what 'nothing' means. A state of nothingness implies the total absence of both potentiality and actuality. Otherwise there is 'something'."
I think 'inclusion' and 'definition' are not
mutually exclusive notions; you cannot say something is not an inclusion but a definition as an inclusion can very well be a part of a definition. If a statement is a definition it does not prevent if from containing (or not
containing) an inclusion of some subordinate notion. What I meant was that you have included a certain notion into your definition, a notion which was not inherent in your definition - the latter could have been adopted without that additional notion. You suggest efining "nothing" as including absence of any potentiality. It is not the only possible choice. I am sure that you are perfectly
able to choose a definition of "nothing" which does not include the absolute absence of any potentiality. A definition is after all a matter of choice.
You also wrote:
"It is certainly not 'empty' since its truth-value disproves the opposite roposition, 'something can come out of nothing'." It is a tautology because, if your definition is adopted (which includes the
notion of absence of any potentiality) it makes your statement true by definition and therefore adding nothing to what has already been included
into the definition. A tautology is empty in that it simply reiterates the premise.
Finally you wrote:
"Just cut the long words and simply say I am begging the question. Geesh. And no, I am not begging the question, I am simply pointing out that 'something can come out of nothing' is illogical, given the meaning of each."
I suspect that if one measures the frequency of "long words" (or, rather of fancy terms) in your writing and in my comments to them, the result is far from being clear-cut. As to the essence of that passage, you simply repeat
the same statement I commented to originally. The "meaning of each" is a matter of definition, and, as I said before, you include into your definition of "nothing" the notion of an absolute absence of any potentiality which is not necessarily inherent in the term "nothing" and may legitimately be not included.
I am sure you see that we are going in circles, so, imo, a continuation of this exchange of opinions is hardly justified - you repeat the same notions and I reply with variations of the same counter-notions. So, I suggest that
we agree to disagree and stop at that. Recall that I only made one critical comment regarding your article and like it otherwise, so you should not get angry, not to mention condescending and rude.
Best wishes.
Amiel
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
|
Title |
Author |
Date |
Rebutting the blatantly empty discourse |
Tremblay, Francois |
Jul 19, 2004
|
I don't mean to be rude, but I am not the one who started repeating himself. You keep arguing that I went out of my way to make a logical rebuttal to Craig by changing the definition of "nothing". Unless you can point to a definition of "nothing" which is better adapted to the context of our metaphysical discussion, and which does not include absence of potentiality, then you might have a case. Otherwise, there is no point in this discussion.
In either case, thank you for the letter and interest.
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Related Articles: |
Dr. Craig's Unsupported Premise
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